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BRUNNER'S CRITICISM OF SCHLEIERMACHER

Yasutoki Hika
Theological Seminary
of
Kwansei Gakuin University, Kobe, Japan. 1926
Kyoto Imperial University, Japan. 1930

Thesis
Submitted in the
Department of Philosophy of Religion
in partial fulfillment of the
requirement for the degree of
Master of Arts
in the
Pacific School of Religion
1941

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INTRODUCTION

East and West, War and Peace, Bomb and Bomb: this thesis has been written while hearing the inaudible awful tone of death in my mind and seeing the invisible change of the world with my spiritual eyes.

This is the humble representation of my work in the field of the philosophy of religion.

Ten years ago when I was a student of Kyoto Imperial University, Kyoto, Japan, Dr. S. Hatano, Professor of philosophy of religion, selected the "Reden" of Schleiermacher as a text book for our seminar. The seminar room was not large, and the atmosphere was gloomy and dark. Seven students - three Buddihsts, two Christians, and two students of philosophy, sat around the table.

At that time I was a rationalist and I was griped by traditional evangelical religion.

Before that time, I had often heard about relegious experience from my father and my mother. I could not understand it. Religion was a mystery for me; I was interested in philosophy and studied the following: Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft Religion. Kritik der Urteilskraft, Metaphysik der Sitten, Hegel's Phaenomenologie des Geistes, Religion, Enzyklopadie, Schelling's Uber das Wesen der Menschliche Freiheit.

INTRODUCTION

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Über das Wesen der Menschliche Freiheit.

But through the Reden I was introduced to the field of the philosophy of religion.

I was so intoxicated with it that it became a second Galatians for me.

Many of my colleagues entered into the study of philosophy: Heidegger, Husser, Jaspers, Hegel, Kant, etc. but I remained in the field of the philosophy of religion. I continued my study of Schleiermacher. I think that Christian theology should be grounded on the theology of Schleiermacher.

The world today is the world of chaos. There is war in the Far East and there is also a war in Europe. It seems to me the present day is the age of the world at war. Everything - including spiritual, economic, political movements - is controlled by war. We cannot think of the history of the twentieth century without thinking about war. The world is changing its shape day by day.

One of my friends spoke to me when I was in Japan, "It is an easy-going way of life to study theology in such times as the present day."

But my conviction is that even though this is true, the study of theology should be continued.

What is the present day task of Christian theology?

Before we start considering the Christian theological movement, we mustthink deeply into the causes of the present-day chaos. And we must start this new task through deepest meditation.

But through the Logos I was introduced to the field of the philosophy of religion.

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This is why I am studying the philosophy of religion.

It is the most important thing to study even in a chaotic age.

Through the kindness of Dr. S. Imai, and the kindness of the faculty of the Pacific School of Religion, I have had the great privilege of studying here at the Pacific School of Religion.

My interest in the field of the philosophy of Religion has been further heightened through contact with professor John C. Bennett. According to Dr. Bennett's suggestion, I took the subject: "Brunner's Criticism of Schleiermacher".

A controversy over the significance of Schleiermacher has raged in German theology ever since the close of the world war. In the period just before the war Schleiermacher was almost universally treated as the founder of a new epoch of theological work that was in harmony with modern culture, even though reservations were made with regard to his various positions toward all special questions.

Today among the representatives of the so-called dialectical theology such as Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and Friedrich Gogarten, Schleiermacher's significance is either generally denied or it is treated as being wholly of a negative value; he is not to be acknowledged as a

true leader, but, on the contrary, he must be opposed as a false leader and repudiated.

This fact is primarily due to Schleiermacher's having himself thought and of having taught others to think of theological work as basically identical with work in the science of religion. He rejected the old definition of theology which sprang from Scholasticism, namely, that it is the science of God. For critical thought, and that means for scientific thought, there is and can be no "science of God". Theological work can only be judged as scientific when it is the "science of religion", religion being understood in its historical and psychical nature, that is to say, as the history and psychology of religion.

In contrast to this view point, dialectical theology returns to the old scholastic definition and to the manner of thinking implied in that definition. Indeed this is connected with a general inclination toward Scholasticism which is today variously expressed within the field of philosophy. Thus the polemic is whether Schleiermacher's own position as a whole is determined by a genuinely religious motive and whether it was his intention to bring this specifically religious motive to the clearest possible expression or, if this is not the case, whether his position as a whole is not ultimately an expression of a speculative construction, and indeed, actually is a speculative constuction that is essentially built upon

the philosophy of identity in the sense of Schelling.

If the latter alternative is true, Schleiermacher's position would be nothing more than a particular form or a definite type of the philosophy of the identity of Schelling, which hold's the ultimate and highest original principle of being, underlying all particular kinds and stages of existence, to be a supreme but as yet undefferentiated unity of opposites, and as yet undefferentiated union of matter and spirit.

It is this last mentioned interpretation of Schleiermacher that is today defended by the representative of the so-called dialectical theology. Emil Brunner, in his work, Die Mystik und das Wort, which first appeared in 1926 and the second edition of which came out in 1928, has especially attempted to establish this interpretation of Schleiermacher.

E. Aubrey says,

> the approach of Barth to theology is from the problem of what to preach. Brunner is a theological professor and sees the problem through the eyes of an intellectual facing the scientific, humanistic temper of the moderns, and throwing down the gauge to them.
>
> This is an important difference, because Brunner is forced to set his theology in relation, not merely to the human needs of the parish, but also to the intellectual needs of those seeking a re-orientation of modern culture. (Present Theological Tendencies p.89)

This statement is essentially correct.

Brunner can be called the representative systematizer of Dialectical theology. No, he is one of the representative theologians. Brunner's theology has a stimulating power in the thinking world today.

One cannot discuss theological problems without a knowledge of Brunner's theology.

Even theologians, who oppose Brunner's position, are influenced by his theology directly or indirectly. No one can deny the significance of Brunner.

But the purpose of this thesis is not to treat Brunner's theology as a whole. Rather we must limit our task to consider his criticism of Schleiermacher. There are many things to learn from Brunner. The central point of this thesis stands on its understanding of Schleiermacher. But a correct understanding of Schleiermacher, which is included in chapters II and III, presupposes Brunner's criticism.

In chapter I we shall endeavor to give a brief sketch of Schleiermacher's life, which is so important in understanding his theology.

In chapter II and III we shall seek to clarify some of the characteristics of Schleiermacher's theology which have been misunderstood by Brunner, and which have provided the basis for his criticism of Schleiermacher. Also we shall try to grasp the essentials of Schleiermacher's philosophy of religion.

In chapter IV we shall try to clarify Brunner's criticism of Schleiermacher.

In chapter V we shall attempt to understand the source of the present crisis theology, finding Schleiermacher's significance for theology today and criticising

Brunner' theology.

I would express my most sincere appreciation to professor John Bennett for his valuable suggestions and criticisms and for the use of his valuable references.

I wish to thank Dr. John Wright Buckham, professor Emeritus of the philosophy of religion and Christian Theology of the Pacific School of Religion, who gave me helpful suggestions and lent me valuable manuscripts, to Dr. Arthur Cushman McGiffert Jr., president and professor of theology of the Pacific School of Religion, who also gave me helpful suggestions and encouragement, to Dr. James Muilenberg, professor of Old Testament Literature and Semitic Languages of the Pacific School of Religion, who also gave me helpful suggestions and read the draft for correction, to Dr. Adolf Keller, professor of the University of Zurich, who was an Earl Lecturer in 1940, who also gave me helpful suggestions, to Dr. George Toloner Tolson, librarian who helped my work in borrowing books from other university libraries. I heartily thank my friends Mr. Robert E. Mickey and Mr. Marvin A. Keisler who read the draft for corrections.

I wish to express my gratitude to the University of California library and the Theological school in Harvard University, which gave me the use of their books, and especially to Holbrook library of the Pacific School of Religion, where I worked so comfortably during the past year.

The highest mountains of Reality and Truth are standing before us. The history of humanity is the story of the struggle to climb these mountains. Through these efforts and struggles the understanding of the chaos of our age will be disclosed.

Let us climb this highest beautiful mountain, singing and praying with John Henry Newman

Lead, kindly light, a mid th'encircling gloom
Lead thou me on!
The night is dark and I am far from home.

Lead Thou me on!
Keep thou my feet;
I do not ask to see the distant scene
One step enough for me.

CHAPTER I

A SKETCH OF SCHLEIERMACHER'S LIFE

Wilhelm Dilthey says, "the philosophy of Kant is perfectly understood without the knowledge of his person and his life, but Schleiermacher's meaning and his Weltansicht and his works need the fundamental knowledge of his life".[1]

All philosophy is related to the philosopher's person and his life.

For example, in the case of Kant: "His philosophy is perfectly understood without knowledge of his person and his life". This statement itself indicates the deepest relationship of his person and his philosophy.

But in the case of Kant the relationship between person and philosophy, has a passive meaning to understanding of his thought.

To live and to think are combined in Kant and Schleiermacher. However in he case of Kant, to think itself was his life and in the case of Schleiermacher, to live itself was his philosophy.

To understand Kant's thought is to understand his life. On the contrary, to understand Schleiermacher's life is to understand his thought.

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[1] Leben Schleiermacher's Vorwort Dilthey zur Iste Auflage. 1870.

Again Dilthey says "For Schleiermacher to live was better than to study and to think. His excellent personality and purity are more than his whole works which worked out in this world".[2]

H. R. Mackintosh wrote "the philosophy of Kant... can be made fairly intelligible to a reader who knows little of nothing of the philosopher's personal career, but the thought of Schleiermacher is luminous only when read in the light of his biography".[3]

The following sketch of Schleiermacher's life depends upon Dilthey's excellent work Schleiermacher's Life.[4]

The awakening of Schleiermacher's soul could be thought of as the end of the culture of German enlightenment.

Schleiermacher has an unique religious character by nature. He was filled with living religious feeling throughout his life. Religion was the final principle of his life and his philosophy.

Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher was born in Breslau on November 21, 1768. He was the son of an army chaplain of the Reformed Church. His piety filled his blood. He said, "piety was the mother's womb, in whose sacred darkness my young life was nourished and was prepared for a world still sealed for it".[5]

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[2] Ibid, p.XI

[3] H. R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, pp.21-22

[4] Leben Schleiermachers. Von Wilhelm Dilthey First edition 1870, Second edition 1922.

[5] Reden, Iste Auflage, p.14.

In 1783, when he was fifteen years of age, his parents sent him to a boarding school of the Moravians, a pietistic sect, (Herrnhut Bruder-gemeinde)[6] where he was subject to a religious atmosphere which influenced his view of religion and its value during the reaminder of his life

First he was at the school at Misky, in upper Lusatia, and then at the Seminary at Barby. Here Schleiermacher read avidly both in philosophy and general literature.

But he soon found himself in conflict with the theological outlook and confined intellectual horizons of these institutions, and 1787 after some painful correspondence with his father he departed to study at the University of Halle. Schleiermacher studied at Halle 1787-1789, there he became acquainted with debate among philosophers concerning the philosophy of Kant, with the Leibniz-Wolffian school through its eminent representative, J. A. Eberhard, and with the general history of philosophy, especially Plato and Aristotle.

At this time he translated parts of the Nicomachean Ethics and composed a number of philosophical essays including papers on Ethics, largely critical of Kant. His interest in Plato which culminated in his important studies and translations originated in the classical atmosphere of Halle.

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[6] Nik. Ludwig Grof von Zinzendorf, founder. 1740.

For a year following his departure from Halle he lived with his uncle, Stubenrauch at Drossen, continuing his philosophical study and writing.

During the summer of 1790 he was made a licentiate of the Reformed Church.

In October of 1790, he accepted a position as tutor in the household of Count Dohna of Schlobitten, with whom he remained until 1793. The years with the family of Count Dohna seem to have been a time of skepticism. According to Schleiermacher's own account, the years with the family of the Count were significant in the forming of his world's view because they afforded him a vision of human life at its best. The family was cultured, art-loving, and deeply pious.

Schleiermacher later declared that it was there that he learned the true nature of Humanity and "freedom", his view of which was one of the important factors in the development of his ideas of morality and religion.

1794 he received a church appointment in Landesberg an der Warthe, where he served for about two years. During this period he collaborated with Sack, in the translation of a volume of sermons by the Edinburgh professor, Blair. More important for the development of his thought was the formation of an interest in the work of Spinoza through reading Jacobi's Briefe uber die Lehre des Spinoza, published in 1785. This interest resulted in the compo-

sition of some essays on Spinoza.[7]

In 1796 Schleiermacher moved to Berlin as a chaplain of the Reformed Church. He remained in this position for six years. During this period there appeared his earliest and philosophically most influential works Reden über die Religion, and Monologen.

Probably the most important factor in the maturing of his thought was his friendship with members of the romantic circle especially with Friedrich Schlegel and Henriette Herz.

Here I want to call attention to the relation between Romanticism and Schleiermacher. The name of Romanticism is given to a group of poets, critics in the history of German leterature. This name also is given to the literary movement which was founded by Victor Hugo in France, and to the group of musicians, such as Weber, Schuman, Chopin, Wagner. It means the protest to the so-called classic art, and the development to the naturalism of the next generation.

Today the Romanticism is classic. Romanticism is not the philosophical tendency; it is not a theory, rather it is a kind of feeling. Romanticism, in a word,is the thought of the spring-time of life.

Fantastic, joyful, praise of beauty and love in the spring-time, sorrowful feeling of separation in the Fall,

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7. Werk. Ph. IV. p.283. L. S. I. Denkmale P. 65ff Kurze Darstellung des Spinozis tischen systems. Spinozismus.

these feelings are Romanticism. Consequenty, it is impossible for Romanticism to build a form as a theory. No one can attempt to receive the feeling which belongs to Romanticism, from the Reden über die Religion of Schleiermacher.

Schleiermacher did not try to express the Romantic feeling with theoretical expressions. It was impossible.

He reflected the meaning of the feeling which is in Romanticism, and heightened the philosophical problem, which is related to the Universe, Infinite, Man, History, and the Individual. And he showed the thinkers of the Enlightment that the "life of feeling" itself was the basis of value.

From the end of the 18th century to the beginning of the 19th century, Germany suffered by the war, the French invasion. From the bottom of this suffereing the German people built the new ideas of life of the modern Germany.

The Romantic movement felt this new purpose and these new ideas, and it is clear that the Romantic movement took a central position in the age.

What is the ground of this movement? Here we shall seek the content of the culture of Berlin.

In general, war and victory stimulated that nation. Friedrich the Great's reign was that of political absolutism. Under this dictator, there arose the receptive critical study and negative cultural spirit, among the in-

telligentia of Berlin. Here arose the German Enlightment Movement, represented by Schultess, Ramler, Sulzer, Moses Mendelssohn, Lessing etc. They led the middle class of Berlin. But their movement was destroyed by theabsolute power of Friedrich the Great. This is one ground of the rise of Romanticism.

The other ground is this. The war which continued from 1756 to 1763 gave a great stimulus to the new spiritual movement in Berlin. There appeared many practical and realistic pamphlets. Of course the movement of enlightenment continued actively during the war. War gave the vital spirit to the higher class, at the same time, there appeared the lower literature for the lower class in Berlin.

It is clear that the old intellectual-moral atmosphere of Berlin determined the new life-view and new world-view of Schlegel, Teake, and Achleiermacher. They fought against the old intellectual moralism. They appreciated the mind of Prussia. The Romantists and the Moralists had an earnest mind on the one hand, and hedonistic sceptic thoughts on the other.

This tendency depended upon the atmosphere of Berlin at that time.

The great poet Goeth's work Wilhelm Meister appeared at this time and it taught young people the value of the Individual and of feeling and of the will of the Individual. Then there happened one more important thing, the combination

of Moses Mendelssohn with the Romanticists. Mendelssohn opened his home to those interested in art and literature and he influenced many artists. There was a reading group once a week, which met at the salon of Dorothea and her husband Veit, a banker. Goethe, appeared in Berling in 1778. Many Romantists were influenced by Goethe, but only Schleiermacher gave eternal scholastic expression to this new life-view and a content of feeling.

Schlegel came to Berlin in 1797 and roomed with Schleiermacher. At that time, Schleiermacher's attitude toward Romanticism was negative.

He respected Schlegel's personality and his creative thought. Schlegel encouraged the writing of the Reden. Schlegel intended to utilize Schleiermacher for his magazine Athenaum. Of course Schleiermacher contributed to this magazine through various articles. In these articles he treated the problem of religion. We can find in these articles the germ of the thought of Reden.

As to his attitude to the study of the religious phenomena, we can find the following expressions. "The thing which should be apologized (defended) should be apologized from the thing itself. This method is applied to the study of religion. Religion must not be means!..."[8] "Doctrine consists through destroying the religious sense, (Religioser sin) there remains only Caput Mortum - a corpse."[9]

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[8] Leben Schleiermacher, I Anhang, p.101.

[9] Ibid., p.104.

"Religion is not scientific knowledge. Religion is distinguished from action. Man can live without Religion but he can not be moralistic...."[10] But his conception of religion in Athenaum is ambiguous.

Schleiermacher started to write the draft of Reden August 1798.[11]

At this time, the first speech, "Defence" of his Reden was published in the magazine, Athenaum. At this time, he had a conviction of his own mission, in the fellowship with Henriette Herz, Veit, Wilhelm Schlegel. This Movement was very important for Schleiermacher's life. He did not talk about the publication of his Reden. Schlegel found out the mystery (Reden) of his friend which was hidden in February, 1799.

On the 15th of February, 1799, he was invited to Potsdam, as a pastor by Sack. By this time he had almost finished the Second speech "the nature of religion" of the Reden.

The first two chapters give certain impressions to the reader; its construction is very artistic and creative; its expression is strong and powerful. Intuition which impressed him so strongly is fulfilled in these two chapters. He entered into the life of a pastor which was treated in the next chapter of Reden. He found the "perfect church"

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10 Ibid., p. 100

11 Leben Schleiermachers, II, p.416.

and preached before the King in Potsdam. Here he completed the third speech "the Cultivation of Religion" and the fourth "Association in Religion, or Church and Priesthood", and the fifth "the Religion".

The first two speeches are full of brilliant creative thought.

Schlegel read the third speech and said, it was a poor form of literature, and suggested this to Schleiermacher. Schleiermacher too confessed his weakness. In the fourth speech, appeared the result of Schlegel's suggestion.

Schleiermacher's life as a pastor was too busy. Before he stated the fifth speech, he read Plato's work, in order to escape from his troublesome daily life. In this speech one can find platonic expressions.

At the end of his work, he wrote to Herz. "My Reden is completed, now it is 10. a. m. April 15th. I hope that it is read as it is". He couldn't sleep that night.

His heart was filled with deep inspiration through reflection upon the past few months.

In 1800 he wrote off the "Monologen". In the same year he published his widely read confidential letters on Freidrich Schlegel's Lucinde, a pamphlet in which he defended Schlegel's unfortunate work which had been condemned as both inartistic and indecent. This work marked the high point of a tension between him and the authorities of the church coming as it did as the result of a friendship with

the romantists which had been expressly disapproved by church leaders.

Schleiermacher's close relationship to Schlegel and Henriette Herz, had not helped his reputation and standing in the church. Even his Reden had been widely condemned as Spinozist and pantheistic.

1802, he accepted a charge in Stolpe in Pommerania. Schleiermacher remained at Stolpe until fall of 1804, when he went to Halle as professor in theology and University preacher.

In 1804, he entered the faculty of the University of Halle.

He prepared lectures on the theory of the interpretation of the Scriptures, on the writings of St. Paul, on dogmatic theology, Christian Ethics, Church history, and an"Encyclopedia" of theology.

Schleiermacher's work at the University at Halle was interrupted in the winter of 1806-1807 by the Napoleonic war and was never again taken up. After the defects at Jena and Auerstadt the area was thrown into general confusion and Halle itself was plundered by the French soldiery. These events roused his patriotism. At considerable personal risk he became active in a movement for resistance and recovery of German freedom.

In the summer of 1807 Schleiermacher delivered lectures on the History of Greek philosophy in Berlin and in the Autumn of the same year he moved to Berlin where he

resided for the rest of his life.

At about the same time he became engaged to the widow of a young minister who had been a friend and who had died of a fever while serving in the war in 1807. Schleiermacher became engaged to the young woman in 1807 and married her in 1808. Her name was Henriette von Willich. Schleiermacher proposed great happiness in his domestic life and apparently attained emotional stability in it.

In 1808 he was appointed Reformed preacher at the Trinity Church in Berlin, and its pulpit gave him a great opportunity for ecclesiastical and political influence.

In 1810 the University of Berlin was constituted and Schleiermacher was oppointed professor on the theological faculty.

From 1808 to 1810 Schleiermacher was deeply concerned with political affairs. He worked both through the pulpit and with his pen to instill a greater sense of Unity in the German people, and to emphasize the importance of the good of natural community as compared with the private well-being of a few individuals. He was one of the leaders of an organization for the securing of German freedom, and in connection with this work he came in contact with the political and military leaders of Germany.

Schleiermacher's position in the Church also made him a leader in the organization of ecclesiastical affairs. He worked for a union of the protestant churches in Germany, for the freedom of the church from the authority of the state

in matters concerning itself, for a decentralizing of church authority which would allow more freedom to the individual church bodies, and for the inclusion of theological seminaries in the Universities as one department with the absolute freedom of thought and teaching.

Schleiermacher's pre-occupation with church and state affairs was one of the factors which prevented him from formulating more exactly and publishing his philosophical system.

His time was also taken up with extensive historical, philosophical theological studies.

His lectures at the University of Berlin during the last twenty years of his life covered an immense range of subject.

He gave a course on Christian Ethics. He expanded his interests to include courses on the theory of the State, the theory of education and aesthetics. More important for theology were his lectures on dogmatic theology of which his "Kurze Darstellung des theologischer studiums",[12] and "Der Christlicher Glaube nach den Grundsatzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt"[13] were the most important.

He lectured and wrote on the critical understanding of certain parts of the New Testament and devised a recon-

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[12] Kurze Darstellung des theologischen studiums. 1811 and 1830. English translation. William Farrer, Edinburgh, 1850.

[13] Iste Auflage, 1821-1822., 2te Auflage, 1830. English translation, edited by H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart. Edingurgh 1928.

struction of the Life of Christ. His most important philosophical work was the composition of lectures on philosophical ethics and on what he called Dialectic, a course which covered the theory of knowledge in the broad sense and what he took to be its Metaphysical implications.

Schleiermacher had begun writing his Dialectic for publication, but it was interrupted by his death.

Schleiermacher died in Berlin on February 12, 1834. The friends who were present often spoke of the deathbed scenes. Some of his utterances may be recorded here. At one time, just after recovering from the effects of laudanum, calling his wife to his bedside, he said,

> I am, in fact, in a state between consciousness and unconsciousness, but inwardly I enjoy heavenly moments. I feel constrained to think the profoundest speculative thoughts and they are to me identical with the deepest religious feelings.[14]

Near the last he said, "I have never clung to the dead letter, and we have the atoning death of Jesus Christ, his body, and his blood. I have ever believed, and still believe that the Lord Jesus gave the communion in water and in wine" (The physician has forbidden him to use wine.)

After receiving the assent of the friends present he added, "Then let us take the Communion: the wine for you and the water for me.... Let no one take offense at the form". Then he calmly gave to each the bread and wine with the usual words and, taking the bread and water for himself, said soliloquizingly: "On these words of the Scripture I rely; they

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[14] Briefe Vol. II, 483 ff.

are the foundation of my faith."

After pronouncing the benediction he said to his wife,"in this love and communion we are and ever will remain united," and in a few moments expired. It is significant of his attitude in religion that his deep regard for the Supper and for the Communion of believers appears at the very close of his life.

The funeral ceremony was held amidst the sorrowing of a nation. It is said that the streets of Berlin, were filled with the 30,000 attendents at the funeral. One of these was the great historian Leopold von. Ranke, professor at the University of Berlin. He said in his reflection, "I can never forget the impression of Schleiermacher's funeral ceremony. Sorrowful voices were heard continuously from all the windows along the streets of Berlin."

Schleiermacher is a great thinker and a great theologian. His thought is living continuously to the present time.

As a paster of a church, as a professor of a University, he was great. He made many practical contributions. He is our friend. George Wehrung says, there are many criticisms on Schleiermacher, but all agreed on one point that "Schleiermacher is a great man".

Bettina von. Arnim, in reflection said, "she did not know wether he was the greatest man or not, but she knows that he was a great man.(Mensch)".

Publication Schleiermacher's works was started in 1868 by Reimar, Berlin.

Neander's judgment upon him at his death remains true, "We have lost a man from whom will be dated henceforth a new era in the history of theology."

CHAPTER II

SCHLEIERMACHER'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

"THE NATURE OF RELIGION"

Friedrich Daniel Schleiermacher devoted his whole life to the study of Religion. His works were concentrated on the problems of religion.

His views developed and changed throughout his life. Therefore if one attempts to clarify his whole Religious thoughts which is related to the philosophy of religion, he finds it a complex problem.[1]

For that reason we here take up only his two epoch making books Über die Religion; Reden an die gebildeten unter ihren Verachtern[2] and Der Christliche glaube, nach den Grundsatzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt[3] in order to understand his philosophy of religion.

In this chapter, we shall seek to clarify the conception of the nature of religion of Schleiermacher which

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[1] Huber, Die Entwickelung des religious begriffs bei Schleiermacher.

[2] Über die Religion: Reden an die gebildeten unter ihren Verachtern. 1799, 1806, 1821, 1831., Critical edit. by G. C. B. Punjer Jena 1879. English translation by John Oman. London, 1892. With introduction.

[3] Der Christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätze der evangelischen Kirche inzusammenhange dargestellt. Iste Auflage 1821-22a 2Fe Auflage 1830.

appears in his two epoch-making books, especially the essential meaning of the feeling of absolute dependence. In the first place we shall try to develop an exposition of Christian faith in section 3 and to clarify it so that the purpose of this statement will lay a foundation for a discussion of the question of the nature of Religion which then begins in section 4. And then we shall point out the error of those who believe that section 3 represents the determination of the content of the nature of religion in Schleiermacher. Then we shall develop the view that section 3 is the formal psychological preparation for the problem of the nature of Religion, and clarify the relation between feeling and immediate self-consciousness. In the second place we shall consider section 4 of Glaubenslehre and treat the feeling of absolute dependence. We shall clarify the identity of the consciousness of Being Absolute dependent, and the consciousness of being in relation with God. And we shall show why Schleiermacher used the expression "the feeling of absolute dependence", and we shall also show that those who emphasize the purely subjective understanding of Schleiermacher's conception of religion completely misunderstand his position. And then we shall turn to the Reden and assert the adaquacy of Schleiermacher's position from the stanpoint of the conception of Higher Realism. In the third place we shall clarify the meaning and content of the feeling of absolute dependence in its relation with the

Higher realism and in its relation with the relative feeling of dependence, and we shall show its transcendence of the entire phenomenal world, and its meaning and what an important element it is is Schleiermacher's philosophy of Religion.

Piety forms the basis of all Ecclesiastical Communions, considered purely in itself, neither a knowing nor a doing, but a modification of feeling, or of immediate self-consciousness.[1] In this sentence Schleiermacher summarizes his conception of the psychological structure of original religious experience. The purpose of this is to lay a foundation for a discussion of the question of the nature of religion which then begins in section 4. It is an old and an ever-recurring misunderstanding to try to find in section 3 a determination of the content of the nature of religion. But that clearly contradicts Schleiermacher's obvious train of thought. The theory of the feeling of absolute dependence is not presented until section 4. And in the sense of Schleiermacher, this theory first presents a determaination of the content of the nature of religion. In section 4 he shows, for the first time, what qualitatively unique or "distinct kind" of feeling consti-

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[1] Der Christliche Glaube. SS 3. Die Frommigkeit, welche die Basis aller Kirchlichen Gemeinschaften ausmacht, ist reich fur sich betrachtet weder ein Wissen noch ein Thun, Sondern eine Bestimmtheit des Gefuhls oder des unmittelbaren selfstbewusstseins.

tutes the nature of religion; while section 3, merely decides whether, in general any - but here as yet indefinite - distinct kind of feeling characterized the nature of religion. The ~~the~~ contention of section 2 is of purely formal nature; it remains within the bounds of formal psychology. Schleiermacher is certainly partly to blame for this misunderstanding. Following directly after the sentence which we have quoted he refers to the corresponding discussion in the Reden uber die religion especially to the sections of the second address, ("Nature of Religion") in which the demarcation of religion from morality and (rational) metaphysics is established. Now the third section of the "Christian Faith" also presents this same demarcation of religion from metaphysics and morality from cosmology and from moral philosophy. And so the terminology of Glaubenslehre was first employed in the fuller discussion which Schleiermacher presented in those sections of Reden über die Religion, beginning with the second edition. However, the incoherencies in Schleiermacher's underlying principle should not mislead us. This principle concerns the fundamental preparation for the problem of the nature of religion, and not the problem itself. It deals with the relation of knowledge action and feeling from the point of view of the existence and not the meaning of the psychological functions which is really involved here. Hence the question is stated from the point of view of empirical psychology. As Schleier-

macher emphatically remarks, he is only presenting material "borrowed from psychology". And as the thesis of section 3 seems to assume that there is no fourth function alongside of knowledge, action, and feeling, the question arises whether or not there is in the soul such a fourth function. Now this statement of the question is quite evidently a problem of empirical psychology. Religious experience is here examined from the standpoint of its psychical existence and not from that of its meaning. A problem of being is involved and not a problem of meaning. Therefore, the nature of the content of religion cannot rightly be brought into consideration here. To be sure the problem of the nature of the content of religion naturally presents a problem of meaning. However, Schleiermacher here only opened up the way for this differentiation. He did not himself carry it through clearly and precisely. That is why there are so many incoherencies and inconsistencies in his presentation. We must, then, for the time being, keep strictly within the bounds of the task before us. We are concerned here only with the formal psychological preparation for the problem of the nature of religion and not with the question of its content. But we can learn from Schleiermacher on this problem, too, and hence we will begin our exposition with him. It is true that in detail, Schleiermacher's formulations concerning the mutual relations of knowledge, action, and feeling are not free from objections. To be challenged in

the fact that he designates the functions in question by the words knowledge, action, and feeling, and then later places feeling in juxtaposition to knowledge and action. However, he is careful enough to consider the affinities and relations which exist between feeling on the one hand, and action and knowledge on the other hand. He does not advocate, then, as has often been and is still repeatedly done, a complete isolation of religious feeling. Yet one must object to the fact that he compares feeling to knowledge and action, whereas the only psychologically valued procedure would be to compare it to functions underlying knowledge and action, namely, to the functions of knowing and willing. This error was caused by the polemic which forms the background of Schleiermacher's whole discussion, the polemic against the old dogmatic scholastic definition of religion as a way of knowing and worshipping God. Since this traditional definition encourages the transformation of religion into metaphysics and morality, it was bitterly combated by Schleiermacher. Hence his formation: religion is neither knowing nor acting. To be sure, as the discussion in the second part clearly shows, he includes thinking and willing under knowing and acting. Nevertheless the train of thought as a whole centers around the conceptions of knowledge and action. This explains how it was possible for Schleiermacher to place feeling in a completely analagous relation to both of the other two functions to thinking

and willing. Consequently he neglected the more intimate homogeneity of willing and feeling, of the affections and the will. However, the decisive and vital point of Schleiermacher's thesis has not yet been touched upon, and what has already been said must be completely subordinated to this vital point. It is Schleiermacher's identification of the conception of feeling with the idea of "immediate self-consciousness" and his obvious treating of religion as a distinct kind of immediate self-consciousness. There can be no doubt that the decisive meaning of his whole formulation lies precisely here. His explanatory remarks bring this out clearly. For this reason, although it is often done, it is wrong to base one's theory of religion on Schleiermacher and then to reject his conception of feeling. It must also be added that, taken objectively, the most important insight of Schleiermacher must be found in his identification of feeling and immediate self-consciousness. When Schleiermacher places the psychological scene of religion in immediate self-consciousness, his interest is directed toward the immediacy of fundamental religious-experience. And the opposite view, which he has in mind and hopes to exclude, is that of rational reflection upon religious experience and its conceptual forms of expression. Fundamental religious experience does not belong to the sphere of speculation, but to that of immediate self-consciousness the uttermost depth of the spiritual life of man.[1]

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[1] Ibid., SS 3.

What Schleiermacher has in mind here is entirely in line with the well known description in the second address of "that first mysterious moment" of religious experience, the description of which is followed with the words: "I can only show you the attitudes and feeling which develop from these elements. But this must be said: no matter how perfectly you may understand them when you believe that you have then clearly in your consciousness, if you do not know and cannot show that they have originated in you and were originally identical and undifferentiated, do not argue further with me or with yourselves, for it is not so... You may have memory and ability to imitate, but you have not religion."[1] Thus the general psychological observation underlying Schleiermacher's estimation of the psychological structure of religious experience is his distinction between the subjective and the objective consciousness, and his conception of their relation to each other. But it must be remembered that Schleiermacher's distinction differs from a similar distinction made by modern psychology. Schleiermacher conceives of the objective consciousness in the sense of perceptual objectivity. The discovery that there is also a non-perceptual comprehension of objects was made later. Schleiermacher does not reckon at all with any such process. He thought only of perceptual objectiviyy, more precisely, of the reflective processes of the mind in which

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[1] Reden: Zweite Rede, über das Wesen der Religion.

it results. It could be held, then, that there is an objective content and an objective relation for the jubjective consciousness. Of course, it would have to be of an entirely different type from the objectivity of ordinary acts of perception and thinking. Schleiermacher, expressly observes that his term "feeling" needs to be qualified. Hence he added the qualification "immediate", lest anyone be led to thibk of a self-consciousness which is more like an objective consciousness or a conception of one's self reached by introspection. By way of explanation, Schleiermacher then continues: "when such conception of ourselves as we find in a certain moment comes home to us, or when it penetrates the separate functions of our state of mind, then this self-consciousness seems to accompany the state of mind itself. To distinguish this type of self-consciousness from the type which merely accompanies the momentery state of awareness, he then uses the expresssion "immediate self-consciousness". The distinction between the subjective and the objective consciousness is interpreted by Schleiermacher so that only the subjective consciousness penetrates into the inmost depths of the human mind. The objective visualizing consciousness, even when it is made an object to the subject, is only secondary to this deeper subjective consciousness. But other fact is also implied in Schleiermacher's expression "immediate self-consciousness" which can alone reveal to us its full meaning as a unifier and coordinator

of the other functions. We refer to "self-consciousness". By immediate self-consciousness he means the self, the "I", the personality-forming factor of human mental life. The experiential character of the subjective consciousness in question is further characterized as belonging to self or ego consciousness.

A self - an ego - is the bearer of the experience. The relation to its self or the ego is therefore fundamental to the experience. Thus when religion is characterized by Schleiermacher as belonging to immediate self-consciousness it is at the same time regarded as an affair of our personal Self. Accordingly religion is always related to or derected toward the self. And religion really is then, a direction of and of and relatioh to the self. That must be again be emphasized most emphatically, if Schleiermacher's position is to be properly interpreted. Religion does not belong to the mere manifestations or activities of the Self. It is a direction of the self, more precisely characterized, it is way in which the Self is directed or finds itself directed. In this conception of "direction", there is implied a reference to an objective counterpole of the condition of religious feeling in Schleiermacher's sense of the word. It is at this point that Schleiermacher then begins to consider the content of the nature of Religion.

The common element in all howsoever diverse expressions of piety, by which these are conjointly distinguished from all other feelings, or, in other words, the

self-identical essence of piety, is this: the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God.[1]

Schleiermacher defined the nature of religion as a feeling of dependence. In the fourth paragraph of the Glaubenslehre, he stated more exactly that, the nature of piety is the individual's consciousness of being absolutely dependent upon God, or which is the same thing - of being in relation to God. Here we are concerned with the meaning of the statement. At first of all it is necessary to note the relation ofthese two characterizations of each other. To say that we are conscious of being in relation to God is asserted to be identical with saying that we are conscious of our absolute dependence. The consciousness of absolute dependence, the feeling of absolute dependence, as Schleiermacher later also expresses it, is the uniquely determining idea. The other characterization, which uses the idea of God, merely aims to connect this uniquely determining idea with traditional terminology. This fact is of the very greatest importance. It shows that Schleiermacher knew that the customary attempts to define the nature of religion are, strictly speaking, really empty tautologies. Over against

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[1] Der Christliche Glaube. §.4.
Das gemeinsame aller noch so verschiedenen Aenssenungen der Frommigheit, wordurch diese sich zugleich von allen andern Gefuhlen unterscheiden, also das sich selbst gleiche Wesen der Frommigheit ist dieses, dass wir uns unser selbst als Schlechtin abhangig, oder dasselbe sagen will, als in Bezichung mit Gott bewusst sind.

such verbal definitions, his formulation marks the beginning of a real factual definition of religion. When the nature of religion is defined with idea of God, the actually decisive problem lies precisely in this idea of God. And this inevitably leads to mental confusion. "God" is just the traditional linguistic term for the conceptual object of religion. The whole problem of the nature of religion is included in the question of conceptual object of "religion". For that can only be "religious" which contains the nature of religion.

Hence all traditional definitions of religion either leave the decisive quetion of the nature of religion entirely undetermined or they assume it in their formulation in the form of a petitio principii or a begging of the question. The former is the case when the idea of God itself is conceived in a purely formal way, and on the other hand, the latter is true when a definite idea of God is meant by the word God. And ordinarily this alternative, not being kept clearly in mind, is not decided.

The dogmatic scholastic definition of religion as the "knowledge and worship of God" is the clearest illustration of this. But in the last analysis that is also true of quite recent attempts to define Religion with the idea of the "Holy" (Windelband, Soderblom, Rudolph Otto) or with the idea of the "Numinous". (Rudolph Otto, Friedrich Heiler).

The idea of the holy and of the numinous are verbal

definitions of the religious conceptual object. But these writers make no attempt to give a real definition of that object. At least they make no straight forward attempt, and hence they fail to give us a clear and precise definition of it. Indeed Schleiermacher's point of view is deliberately intended to escape it. For in the sense in which Schleiermacher understands it, the idea of the feeling of absolute dependence constitutes a real definition of the religious conceptual object. Not only is his idea of religion not purely subjective, but his main interest is directed precisely toward grasping the content of the religious object. The purely subjective interpretation of Schleiermacher's conception of religion is a complete misunderstanding of his position. Before proving this statement by expounding the Glaubenslehre, we must first call attention to the Reden über die Religion, for it is upon them that the widespread subjective misinterpretation is chiefly based. Yet it goes without saying that in reaching a full understanding of Schleiermacher it is absolutely unjustifiable to subordinate the Glaubenslehre to the Reden, as for exampoe, even Natorp does. The Reden über die Religion must rather be subordinated to the Glaubenslehre. For on the whole the Glaubenslehre presents Schleiermacher's position in its clearest most mature form. Nevertheless the idea of religion in the Reden lies precisely in the direction of the position taken in the Glaubenslehre. When

Schleiermacher in the first edition of the Reden describes religion as the perception and feeling of the Universe, and then, in the later editions, more and more subordinates the idea of perception to that of feeling, there already lies in this fact the germ of the theory of the feeling of absolute dependence. Actually, then, an interest in the religious conceptual object is strongly at work even in the idea of religion of the Reden, and indeed, even in the very first edition. That this has so often been and still is overlooked is due primarily to a misunderstanding of the relation of Schleiermacher to Spinoza. To be true, in the second address he says, "offer with me reverently a tribute to the name of the holy rejected Spinoza. The high world-spirit pervaded him; the Infinite was his beginning and his end; the Universe was his only and his everlasting love".[1] Now this tribute to Spinoza is not, as is usually said, a reference to the pantheism of Spinoza, at least not primarily and in its basic purpose unquestionably the idea of immanence which runs through the Reden is pantheistic. But the decisive religious interest of Schleiermacher does not stick throughtout to this pantheistic wrapping, and this is also true of his relation to Spinoza.

Schleiermacher rests back on Spinoza over against the radical subjectivism of Fichte, who ultimately derived the human Ego solely from himself. Only religion can suc-

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[1] J. Oman's Translation. p.40

cessfully combat such a perfect idealism and meet it with a Higher realism.[1] It is this higher realism with which Schleiermacher is concerned. He praises Spinoza because to him the universe was the highest and ultimate reality. Schleiermacher's definition of the nature of religion as the "perception and feeling of the Universe" has to be interpreted from this point of view. Only then does the argument of second address become clear. External nature - so Schleiermacher begins - which so many take to be the holy of holies of religion, is really only its outermost court. Neither the fear of the powers of Nature, nor the awe of natures quantitative infinitude, not the happy enjoyment of the beauties leads one into the unizeu depth of religion. The outer world is always primarily to be interpreted by the inner. Consequently it is quite peculiarly to the affections of the mind to which religion is related. In order for man to have religion he must first have discovered human nature, and he finds that only in and through love. Human nature, then, transmits the true substance of religion, that is to say, human nature with her spiritual life - so we must interpret Schleiermacher - constitutes a limitation on all human perceptual and conceptual interpretations of external nature. And to that extent human nature does not exclude, but rather includes the whole of nature which comes within man's ken. Yet

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[1] Reden. Iste Auflage, p. 54.

human nature is composed of an infinite diversity of all kinds of particular individuals, each one of whom embodies it in his own unique way. Consequently religion embraces the whole being of human nature, not just the entirety of mankind at a given epoch, but the entire existence of humanity for all time, human nature in its complete historical evolution. History in the most unique sense of the word is the higher object of religion. Religion rises and falls with history. Nevertheless - Schleiermacher continues - we are not yet on the border of religion. For human nature also, taking it in the sense already mentioned so as to include in it external nature in its entirety, does not yet constitute the totality of the Universe. "Rather human nature in this sense is related to this totality of the Universe as particular men are related to human nature, ... and there must be found a still higher character in man than his humanity, if we are to identity him and his appearance with Universe". And then Schleiermacher concludes this whole line of thougnt with the judgment which really pervades it from the beginning. "All religion expresses itself in such an awareness of something outside and beyond nature." It is primarily in the light of this statement that full clearness and inner consistency can be given to the passages already quoted. Perception and feeling of the Universe means then the awareness of a reality outside and beyond human nature, using the expression human nature in the theoretically and epistemologically widened sense which

has just been stated. Hence the very idea of the Universe refers to reality of a whole empirical spatio-temporal world, and which limits and supports that world in its entire being and evolution.

It is only a step, and to be sure, a step in exactly the same direction, from the perception and the feeling of the Universe to the feeling of absolute dependence of the Glaubenslehre. For the theory of the feeling of absolute dependence brings into still clearer relief and into sharper expression the interest in the content of the religious object. What is the exact meaning of this idea of a feeling of absolute dependence which dominates the whole Glubenslehre?

According to Schleiermacher's own unequivocal statement, we can best comprehend this idea by distinguishing the feeling of absolute dependence from feelings of dependence which are not absolute but which are only relative feeling of dependence. Such relative feelings of dependence stand in a correlative relation to relative feelings of freedom. In distinction from the relative feelings of dependence the feelings absolute dependence is that in which every phase of consciousness no matter what its specific content may be, is ultimately experienced as dependent. According every thouht of dependence on "something else" is subordinated to this. But a full understanding of this idea requires a more detailed exposition of Schleiermacher.

Ordinarily there is and can be no feeling of absolute dependence on entire domain of the phenomenal world. In varying degrees we always possess independence and freedom over against the existence and the phenomena of the finite world. Consequently within the realms of the phenomenal world, as we ordinarily conceive it, only relative feeling of dependence and of freedom are possible. The combinations of these two feelings are extroadinarily diverse. Between the two extremes of a maximum of feeling of freedom and a minimum of feeling of dependence on the one side and a minimum of feeling of freedom and a maximum of feeling of dependence on the other side, may be found all degrees and types of combinations. But both types of feeling are always intermingled. Now the feeling of absolute dependence "never arises within this sphere".

The feeling of absolute dependence, on the contrary takes us beyond the phenomenal world in its entirety and in its wide possible conception. It brings us in relation to a reality on which the finite world as a whole is dependent.

That "other, presupposed" in the feeling of absolute dependence by the relation of dependence is neither a special aspect of the phenomenal world nor the totality of all its phenomena. It is a reality which transcends the entire phenomenal world, and upon which that world is itself just as dependent as is the particular conscious-

ness which has the feeling of dependence. Consequently, when Schleiermacher characterizes the nature of religion as a feeling of absolute dependence, this proves that he thinks that the decisive and essential feature of religion lies in the relation of man to a reality of higher order, to which the whole phenomenal world is subordinated and by which it is limited. And when he then immediately uses the word God to define the objective content of the religious consciousness, this must mean, as he himself remarks, that this word is taken as expressing first of all what in that feeling is "determining agency" (the objective being over against the one who has the feeling of dependence). And he expressly adds that every other content of the idea of God must first be developed out of this essential content. That feeling is for Schleiermacher the "basic form of all piety".

Hence, in order to sharpen his opposition to Hegel, he stresses the fact that the feeling of absolute dependence is not determined by any previous knowledge of God. But on objective content and on objective relation are certainly includes in the feeling of absolute dependence. Indeed, this objective content is precisely the highest reality determining all finite existence. Let us now call attention to and especially stress an aspect of Schleiermacher's line of thought which is usually either overlooked or misunderstood. For in a special way, a genuine understanding of

the whole theory depends upon it.

How did Schleiermacher reach this conception of a feeling of absolute dependence? He reached it from religious experience and only and exclusively from religious experience. The feeling of absolute dependence is affirmed because of his religious experience. And, further more, only that interpretation which expresses the basic conviction of religious experience as a feeling of absolute dependence is then expounded. In the decisive part of his exposition Schleiermacher writes,"if, now, our theory, looked at from the other side, demands a feeling of absolute dependence, it follows that such a feeling can never be produced by an object in any way presented to us, that is to say by an object belonging to the spatio-temporal world".[1] (Schleiermacher did not deny that the feeling of absolute dependence always has an object. He only denied that it has an object "in any way, presented" and in Schleiermacher's terminology that means an empirical object, one belonging to the spatio-temporal world.) The idea of a feeling of absolute dependence follows, then, as a demand of the basic principle. But this basic principle speaks in the name of piety and of religious experience.

For it aims to express precisely the common element in all the quite distinct form of piety. Accordingly, the exposition of the content of the feeling of absolute dependence, which follows the passage quoted above, is likewise

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1 Der Christliche Glaube, SS3, SS4.

in the name of religious experience. It is the final development of what the feeling of absolute dependence meant in the sense of piety. And in this sense it means man's being limited by the reality which transcends the entire finite wordl, and it refers to man's relation to this transcendent reality. Thus the whole theory of the feeling of absolute dependence rests throughout upon religious experience. It aims only to give conceptual expression to the basic religious conviction which is rooted in all religious experience. It intends to give a more precise definition of the "basic form of all piety". At least this is the meaning of the reasoming which was ultimately most decisive for Schleiermacher himself. The discussion in paragraph 4. of his Glaubenslehre leaves no doubt on this matter. To be sure he developed the theory of the feeling of absolute dependence, not in the body of the Glaubenslehre, but in the exposition of his philosophy of religion in the introduction, and he himself sharply and definitely emphasized this fact. Yet this is no way alters the fact that theory of the feeling of absolute dependence is fundamental for the entire content of the Glaubenslehre, and again speaking for Schleiermacher, it ought to be fundamental.

From the beginning to the end of the Glaubenslehre is filled with this most significant word which is so full of contents, namely,"the feeling of absolute dependence",

ein Schlechthinizes Abhangichkeits gefuhl.

No one can completely understand Schleiermacher's theology without correct understanding of the conception of "the feeling of absolute dependence".

CHAPTER III

HIGHER REALISM

In this chapter I intend to treat the inner understanding and to investigate the religious realism which appears in the Reden, and to endeavor to clarify the conception of the universe implied in the Higher Reality.

The word "Higher Realism", Höcherer Realismus, which appears once in the Reden is an excellent word to express the nature of Religion, especially to characterize Schleiermacher's philosophy of Religion.

Higher Realism has the meaning that itis not only higher than the lower realism, naturalism, but also it is higher than Idealism. It transcends these, and it has its own deeper meaning and content.

"Reden über die Religion an die gebildeten unter ihrem Verachtern" is influenced by Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy and German idealism and German Romanticis. This is true.

But this opinion which is the usual interpretation given is Histories of general philosophy and History of general literature, intends to find the place of the Reden in the stram of the thought of the time, and neglected the other important problem in the Reden.

In this chapter I intend to treat the inner understanding and to investigate the religious realism, which appeared in the Reden.

In the first place I want to summarize the opinion which was deliverd in the Reden, chapter II "Anschaung und gefühl des Universums" perception and feeling of the Universe. The nature of Religion is neither thougt nor action, rather perception and feeling of the Universe.[1]

If we criticize Schleiermacher's point of view from our historical point of view we se that Immanuel Kant had destroyed the Deism which attempted to place Religion on the rationalistic metaphysic and the Romantic thinkers (including poets) had destroyed the moral Religion, which was founded by Immanuel Kant.

Moreover, if we go back to the stream of History, the freedom of feeling and will, was asserted by the poets of Strum und Drung, and the freedom of creed "was asserted by the philosophersof the'Aufklarung' Enlightment."

From this point of view the Reden is only line in the stream of History of German thought.

We cannot find its uniqueness.

But these above thoughts are the negative side of the Reden that is, the rejection of the subordination of Religion to Metaphysics and morals or creeds. The important thing is the positive side of the Reden, in other words,

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[1] Reden. Iste Auflage, p.80

"the Kingdom of feeling" which is asserted in the Reden.

Immanuel Kant also rejected metaphysics, but he destroyed it positively. He wrote, "I must put aside knowledge for the faith".[1]

We can find in this task the positive side. But in his "Religion innerhalb der blossen Bernunft" which appeared in 1793 [2] in so far as the morality based upon the conception - free man, it does not the "other" which is above man.[3] Inevitably it is expanded to the moral imperative, because man cannot free himself from the absoluteness of his own action.

So-called "Blossen Vernunft" is the moral reason which is insisted in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. (1788)

But Schleiermacher refused to interpret Religion from the moral point of view.

There are many people who are opposed to the Ethical-rationaliatic Religion of Kant.

The poets, Goethe, Schiller, Schlegel, Novalis, Theake etc. and the philosophers, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel,

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1 Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 1781. p.XXX "Ich muste also das wissen Aufheben, um zum Glauben plaz zu bekommen". (Kant's werke Bd. III, Herausgegeben von Hartenstein Leipzig. 1868. 2te Auflage p.25.

2 Religion innerhalb der blossen Vernunft 1793. p.III.

3 Ibid., p.III.

etc. We can say that they created the great golden age in the history of human civilization. But they belong to the world of philosophy, of morality, and of Art. Their thought was based upon the cultural values which are called, Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.

But the value which Schleiermacher asserted in the Reden is not moral good, scientific truth, or aesthetic beauty, but Religious Holy as such. There is an opinion which considers the Holy as one kind of the values of culture as well as truth, goodness and beauty.[1] But Schleiermacher's Holy is distinguished from this.

What is the Holy (Heilige) which is asserted by Schleiermacher?

As Rudolf Otto, explained it about "Das Numinose" "our X cannot, strictly speaking, be taught, it can only be evoked, awakened in the mind; as everything that comes of the spirit must be awakened"[2]

Schleiermacher called this X "Universum", "Universe".

This X is the Infinite Being, the Εν Και παν, the one and the All, the absolute doer, the absolute Transcendence, the Highest Being. It cannot be expressed in our human words.

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[1] Windelband; Pläludien, Das Heilige.

[2] Rudolf Otto. Das Heilige. 1936. p.7. The Idea of Holy translated by Harvey, 1923.

Schleiermacher's thought on the nature of Religion, as mentioned above, is the "anschaung and gefuhl des Universums".

However here we must call attention that this "Anschaunng und gefuhl des universums" is not of the other, but of "Universe". Here we should emphasize the word "Universe". In order that man can have religious experience man must at the beginning have some relationship to the "Universe".[1]

Religion acts not in "Natur" not in special man. (der einzelne mensch) moreover even in the higher humanity but to the Universe that is outside of the humanity and above humanity.[2]

Schleiermacher was the author of Monologen (1800) in which he praised "Humanity".

This is a common thought to his contemporary thinkers, even though Reden teaches that this higher humanity in Religion is but one pause to the Eternal Being. "ein Ruheplatz auf dem Wege zum unendlichen".

In order to cultivate this humanity it must be connected with the Universe which is above humanity.

The highest aim of Religion is to discover the Universe above Humanity, Erinnert ziel der Religion war, ein Universum jenseits und uber der Menschkeit zu entdecken".[3]

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[1] Reden. Iste Auflage, p.80.

[2] Ibid., p.80-105.

[3] Ibid., p.131.

As we have seen above, the "Universe" in the Reden is not the total of the natural humanistic existence, rather it implies the Higher Reality which controlled allexistence.

The conception of the Universe implies a Higher Reality which determines all progress and existence of time and space, this phenomenal world and existing on and in this phenomena.

In fact, Schleiermacher says "recognition of the otherness and self surrender does not exist without a dark resentment (ahndung) of Universe. Anerkennen des Fremden und Vernichten des eigenen... ist micht moglich ohne eine dunkle ahndung des Universums".[1]

Moreover he says, "the more you deny yourself, the more clearly the Universe appears before your eyes. Je mehr ihr euch selbst Verschaindet, desto klare wird das Universum vor euch dastehen".[2]

In another place, he says:

> when we have perceived the Universe, and we reflect upon our "I" how it disappears into the infinite little one in the comparing with Universe. Only the feeling of humility; remains for the mortal man? Wenn wir das Universum angeschaut haben, und von dannen zurucksehen auf unser Ich, wie es in Vergleichung mit ihm ins unendlich kleine Verschwindet, was kann dem sterblichen dann nahr liegen als wohr; ungekunstelte Demut?[3]

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[1] Ibid., p.165.

[2] Ibid., p.166

[3] Ibid., p.109.

When one reads these words, one can find the pure religious heart in the Reden. Yet when one reads carefully the Reden he finds that when Schleiermacher talks about the relationship with the Universe, he uses passive verbs in his sentences. For example ergriffen, erfullung etc.

His attitude to the Universe is one of childlike passivity "Kindlicher passivitat" as such, and is the attitude of humility to the active act of the Universe. "Alles Beschrankte als eine Darstellung des Unendlichen hinichmee, das ist Religion!"[1]

This pure passivity is the heart of Religion in the Reden. This passivity is "the consciousness of absolute dependence, that is the consciousness of relation with God. In other word, 'feeling of absolute dependence' Schlechhiniges abhangigkeits-gefunl"in his great work Christian Faith.[2]

When the Universe appears before man as Absolute Activity it should be felt as tremendum of Rudolf Otto.[3]

But in Schleiermacher the Universe as Das Numinose has an element of fascination.

We can find this element of fascination in his explanation of the mystery of religious experience.[4]

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1 Ibid., p.56

2 Der Christliche Glaube, SS4.

3 R. Otto, Das Heilige 1936. Das gefühl des Überweltlichen, 1932.

4 Reden. Iste Auflage p. 73-75.

But this fascination does not belong to this world, it comes form above. But in any case, our important problem is, the problem of the Reality of this "Universe", that is, the fact of the "Universe" which exists transcendently and actively.

From this point, the Reden, will be understood completely.

The word "Higher Realism, Hocherer Realismus," which appeared one in Reden [1] is an excellent word to express the place of Religion.

The so-called Higher Realism, in Reden has the meaning that it is not only higher than the lower realism - naturalims, positivism - but also it is higher than Idealism. (knat, Fichte's moral idealism) and it can check the victory of Idealism.

Religion, as such in Reden is the first moment of mystery in which man is embraced by the Holy Universe.[2]

"I lie in the bosom of theinfinite world, in this moment I beocme its soul, for I feel its strength and its infinite life, as ifit were my own life, in this moment it becomes my own flesh, for I penetrate in its muscles and its limbs as if in my own. And its inner nerves move as if they were my own nerves according to my own sense and my own (ahndung) resentment piety."

"Ich liege am Bussen der unendlichen Welt, ich

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[1] Ibid., p.54.

[2] Ibid., p.72-75.

bin in diesem augenblick ihre seele, denn ich funle alle ihre krafte und ihr unendliches Leben, wie mein ligenes, sie ist in diesem Augenblicke mein Leib, denn ich durchdringe ihre muskeln und ihre glieder wie meine eigenem, and ihre innersten neven bewegen sich nach meinen Sinn und neiner ahndung wie die neinigen"[1]

Religion is Absolute Consciousness in which feeling is united with intuition.

There is no predicate; Relgion belongs to the original fact (urwirklichkeit) as pure subject.

This precious moment disappears as fast as the dew of the morning, and there remains only the feeling which reflects the Holy in the heart of the man who has experienced religion as such.

Such a suggestion is only a derivative production from the standpoint of the Original experience as such, but we must not forget that this suggestion is an important thing in the Reden as religiousness (Religiositat).

"Die religiosen Gefuhle sollen wie eine heilige Musik alles Tun des Menschen begleiten." The religious feeling ought to accompany all the acts of men "as if it were a holy music."[2]

In this case, this kind of religion is not original religion as such; it is a religion as suggestive

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[1] Ibid., p.74.

[2] Ibid., p.69.

religiousness. Because Religion as such is not parallel alongside with the other forms of consciousness.

Religion as such is combined with culture in so far as it moves towards religiousness.

Here appears the phenomenon which is justified by the holy accompaniment of religiousness. Of course, Religion is not a substitute for the culture. Religion itself is completeness. Religion is highest value; it can not be valued by being utilized or by something other than itself.

But Religion tends to be utilized with God's thought, before culture attempts to utilize Religion with man's thought.

The thought, that the accompaniment along with culture of religiousness is the ruin of religion as such, is a superficial thought.

The principle of Agapē is the incarnation of Highest Realtiy in Religion.

The virtue of religion is to serve culture.

Religion descends from the highest glory to the world of culture and leads men and strengthens men, and it becomes master of culture throught service to culture.[1]

"Die Virtuositat eines Menschen ist nur gleichsam die Molodie seines Lebens, und es bleibt bei einzelnen Tonen, wenn er ihr nicht die Religion beifugt. Diese begleitet jene in unendlich reicher Abwechselung mit allen

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[1] Ibid., p.115.

Tonen, die ihr nur nicht ganz wider strebenk und verwandelt so den einfachen Gesang des Lebens in iene vollstimmige und prachtige Harmonie." The proficiency of man is the melody of his life, but if this proficiency is not accompanied with religion, this melody is a simple, monotonous melody. When Religion accompanies it, there arises an infinite variety of all tones, and it changes the monotonous song of life into a brilliant excellent Harmony.[1]

One recognizes the complexity of conceptions in the Reden which separate religion from from culture, but it asserts the religiousness which sanctifies the culture. In fact, the Reden itself is ambiguous from this point of view, but we must think that Reden itself is not a pure academic work.

Indeed the words "Religion" and"Religiousness" are not distinguished so clearly in the Reden, but we can see everywhere the thought which expresses themoment of the Religious experience in the absolute consciousness and the thought which expresses the continuity of the religiousness as suggestion in life, in the Reden.[2]

In his diary, which seems to be a draft of the Reden he says: "It is not true that Religion is the source of morality, but it is true that the religiousness (Religiositat) is the source of morality and morality is the source

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[1] Ibid., p.115. cf. The secondspeech, p.74. The first speech, p. 56ff. second speech p. 66-67. Fifth speech, p. 280 ff.

[2] Ibid., p.68-69, 265, 266, 267.

of religiousness."[1]

For Schleiermacher the fact that religion penetrates the whole range of culture is a miracle.[2] For Schleiermacher miracle is not a special event. For him the world which is illuminated by the light of religion is itself a miracle. "To me all is miracle....the more religious you are, the more miracles you will see everywhere."[3]

As Schleiermacher said, miracle is Τερας, σημειον, portentem, signum, the experience of miracle is to experience the finite phenomenal events as the symbol of the heavenly infinite Reality.

"Alles Menschliche ist heilig, denn ales ist göttlich." All that is human is holy, for all is divine.[4] To us these words are the heavenly song of man who lives in this world. Now, all of life, apeaks the new meaning, as a symbol of the heavenly word.

Human beings, living in the midst of this life, experience the meaning of life, in the religious self-consciousness which reflects the light of higher Reality which transcends this life.

From this stanapoint, the religioun of Reden can be seen in the midst of life, in the midst of this existence.

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1 Dilthey. Lenen Schleiermachers 1870. Ites Tagesbuch. no. 153.

2 Reden. Iste Auflage p.118

3 Ibid., p.118, p.88.

4 Ibid., p.234.

It is a common opinion, that Schleiermacher's thought is that of immanence. It is a well known fact that dialectical theology especially Brunner's theology dondentrates to attack Schleiermacher's immanent theology in the Reden.

But in the case that the immanent expression is recognized, it means that man describes the conscious facts of man, because it is impossible for man to understand the nature of Universe as transcendent Being; consequently, that which is conscious is only action of Universe.

Such human consciousness is related to transcendent Being. That is, in the meaning of anthropology today it implies the existential-ontological (existenzial-ontologisch) the fact of Transcendence.

As we have seen above, Schleiermacher, as a genius of humanity transcended "humanity", the existential-ontological human being must transcend "humanity". However the ground on which this transcendence is possible, is not called "nothingness" by him, rather called Universe.

It is said that the existential-ontological (existenzial-ontoligisch) means that man places himself in the original events (grandgeschehen) which is not to be explained by human expression.

But this in Schleiermacher's thought is equivalent to the first secret moment "Der erste geheimnisvolle augenblick".[1]

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[1] Ibid., p.73.

That is, the moment , in which man is related to the Universe is the original event -Grandgeschen - which can mot be explained by human words.

In fact that man is related to the Universe, is itself a pure subject, it can not be made a predicate; when one tries to predicate it, its nature as such desappears.

This is the reason why, we state the following before explaining "this moment". "Der feinste Geistuer Religion geht dadurch veloren fur meine Rede, und ich kann ihr innertes Geheimmis mir Schwankend und unsicher enthullen." Through this (moment) the finest soirit of religion disappears in my Reden I must enter into theuncertainty.[1] This moment is not explainable. It is impossible to think about this moment.

In the world which proceeds thought is the absolute self-consciousness. This moment in Reden is the feeling united with intuition. Therefore that feeling is not psychological feeling; it is, rather the "nothingness" of Heidegger, which is experienced through his "Grunderfahrung" original experience.

We can say that "Das Fascinans, Tremendum" of Religion of Reden exists in the Absolute Nothingness.

One who intends to understand Schleiermacher should not be controlled by the external expression of his

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[1] Ibid., p.72.

thought. For example: feeling or absolute; rather one should grasp the deepest meaning and content, which is in these expressions. At that time one can understand Schleiermacher completely. Brunner's criticism of Schleiermacher is to be listed among those which desagree with Schleiermacher. His point of view is critically destructive.

Remembering these things, which have been mentioned in the above two chapters, let us listen to the representative systematizer of Dialectical theology, Brunner in his criticism of Schleiermacher.

CHAPTER IV

BRUNNER'S CRITICISM OF SCHLEIERMACHER

Professor Emil Brunner of Zürich has already made himself known as a representative of the so-called "Dialectic school" of theology.

His theology is watched by the thinking world, in relation to the name of Schleiermacher.

But this relation is not a friendly one. Following is a brief outline of Brunner's criticism of Schleiermacher. According to Brunner, Schleiermacher is a father of Subjectivism. Schleiermacher, as a thinker is much more of a mystic than a Christian. He is constantly being put out of his stide by the intrusion of the fact of Christ, but as constantly he recovers himself and will not be diverted. The idea of religion which he brought with him to Dogmatic from his earlier and more philosophical works never permitted him to listen with an unprejudiced mind to what the New Testament and the Reformers were saying.

Piety for Schleiermacher is not the converse of the sovereign God of redemption but a process of impersonal forces within the soul, a passive reception of the infinite causality.

As we read him, we are forced to make the protest that Mysticism is not at all the same thing as reception of the Gospel nor is God as nature identical with God as spirit.

His Christ differs radically fom the Christ of history and of faith.

The Redeemer acts upon us only as the first source of that stream of Christian life in which we now live and move, at a distance of centuries from Jesus.

Sin is atavistic lack of development, not personal guilt

To understand forgiveness he makes an inference from a scrutiny of our own inward state; we are sure of it because we hage reflected carefully on the infusion of Grace which has changed the balance of forces within our experience - the very opposite pole of truth to themessage of the Reformation.

Schleiermacher is an evolutionary optimist, with the inevitable result that he naturalizes spirit and will persist in turning personality in God and man into impersonal tendencies. He puts the philosophy of history in place of genuine eschatalogy.

Redemption is toned down to civilization. Continuity is the watchword throughout; the crisis of saving grace is ignored.

He has eliminated the conception of moral law and

replaced it by the laws of Nature.

He speaks of forces where a Christian thinker must speak of the Holy Spirit and of human motives. In fact, he never quite escaped from the shadow of that earlier thought, put with so much startling emphasis in his Reden, that the idea of God, the knowledge of what God is and wills, is no essential element in religion.

Bearing in mind these viewpoints shall we listen to Brunner's criticism in more detail.

According to Brunner, Schleiermacher was an empiricist. This forerunner is his most objectionable characteristic. Schleiermacher was foolish enough, he thinks, to believe that a man can reach God through the medium of or by the interpretation of, his own experience.

That Schleiermacher selected the feeling of Absolute dependence as the experience which is to be called religious, i.e. which connects us with God, is to Brunner a matter of secondary importance compared with Schleiermacher's thesis that any aspect of self-conscious experience whatsoever may be identified with the consciousness of God or will give assurance of God. According to Brunner this is the error of all mysticism.

The mysticism Brunner attacks is not classic mysticism with its hostility to culture and social responsibility.

The contemporary mysticism which arouses Brunner's

ire is a romantic aestheticism.[1] Its keynote is experience. Its common interest is the inner emotions of the soul. Its highest value is intensith of feeling.

The mystic of this sort begins with himself. A historical revelation is embarrassing to him. He believes in himself. He suffers under the illusion that he has discovered a way by which he can lift himself or sink himself into the heighths and depths of deity. The mystic, confident in the efficacy of his method, relies on self-help. He saves himself.

> "By his own spiritual exercises he reaches an island of peace in the midst of the world's stormy sea of conflict; a place of quietness where there is no struggle but only rest and enjoyment. There the rift is healed and the individual has a good conscience. He has God now, in the immediate present. His longing is satisfied.
>
> Diese provinz ist ein Teil. Sie ist, wenn man nun das Besondere angeben soll, die Insel des Friedens mitten im Meer der Weltsturme und Kampfe, der Ort der Stille, wo nicht gekampft. Sondern geruht und genossen wird; wo der Zwiespalt aufhort und wo man ein gutes Gewissen hat. Insofern man Religion, Jenes Gottes-Bewustsein hat, in jenen Augenblicken und in jener Funktion, ist und hat man das, was man sein und haben sollte.[2]

Yet this experience, however ineffable, is bought at too great a price. His supposition that in it he has laid hold on God is, according to Brunner, fallacious.

His assertion that he has merged his soul with All is mere phraseology. The fact is that a mystical religion

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[1] Brunner. Die Mystik und das Wort, 2te Auflage. 1928, p.28tt.

[2] Ibid., p. 182.

such as that of Schleiermacher, never gets beyond subjective feeling. It remains an inward movement in the soul of man. It evaporates in an emotional titillation which has no grip on external reality.

It is concerned with human attitudes, not with objective truth. Such a religion becomes an aspect of anthropology and loses its external reference.

According to Brunner's interpretation of Schleiermacher's Mysticism, Religion is a method of private living unto oneself and one's social and physical environment. By a process of spiritual gymnastic individuals will gradually attain a state of perfection here on earth. Religion is equivalent to cultural optimism. It supplies the motive power for working over the raw material of life into orderly living.

It pre-visions no great catastrophic change of scene. Rather, by a gradual continuous progress, the tares will be weeded out from the wheat. The doctrine of evolution is, in fact "the magic-key that opens all doors" of Schleiermacher's thought.

> Es ist schwer, der Geschichtsphilosophie, der Entwicklungslehre Schleiermachers einen bestimmten Platz in seinem System anzuweise. Sie ist allgegenwartig, sie ist der Zauberschlussel, der alle Turen offnet. Es ist alles irgendwie in den entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Grundritz eingezeichnet, alles was vom Menschen und seinem Leben in irgendeiner Beziehung zu sagen ist. Das ist einer der Hauptgrunde, warum sich Schleiermacher heute so grotzen Beliebtheit erfreut. Er hat den Evolutionismus der nachdarwinischen Zeit vorausgenommen und mit dem,, Ge-

schichtlichen Denken in noch ganz ander radikaler Wiese Ernst gemacht, als etwa Herder oder Hegel.[1]

Its omnipresence in his system accounted for the relativity of difference between good and evil. It provided him with his principle of continuity.

It blinded him to the original dualism between the Absolute and the "given" in the world.

According to Brunner, Schleiermacher's system was the result of a thorough going misunderstanding of the nature of God and of his relation to the world. It was based on a pantheistic naturalism. Reading God in terms of substance Schleiermacher was found to correlate, when he did not identify God and the world. Schleiermacher was prevented from maintaining a complete identification only by his notion of causality, which led him to posit as the whence and the why of the world of God who is himself the world under another aspect and who is quite unthinkable apart from the world.

Schliermacher was therefore "sick with immanence". He seemed to be totally unaware of the split which divides existence into two parts: God on the one side, and Man and nature on the other. His failure to perceive this radical dualism was due to his principle of continuity. There was for Schleiermacher no sharp mystic line severing the human from the divine. In the romantic twilight of

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[1] Ibid., p. 276.

his aestheticism he failed to note the demarcations between personalities, the radical character of sin and evil, the hiatus between human progress and heaven. He toned down all sharp differentiations and modified all bitter contradictions in the interest of the continuous progress of mankind onward and upward forever.

> Dieser Relativismus ist das Dämmerlicht, in dem alle harten Gegensätze verschwinden, insbesondere jene, die das Charakteristische des christlichen Glaubens sind. Dieses Wissen um die Aufhebung aller Gegensätze aber gründet in einem Bewustzsein, das selbst kein Wissen ist: im Bewustsein jener absoluten Einheit oder Identität, im „Gefühl". Das subjektive Korrelat jenes absoluten Identitätspunktes ist das mystische Gefühl, in dem der Grundgegensatz, der von Objekt und Subjekt, aufgehoben ist, in dem also „irgendwie" das absolute Göttliche und das Ich identische sind. Hier, im Gefühl, haben wir das Gleichgewicht, das wir draussen nur in der Relativität der Gegensätze erkennen. Hier ist der Einheitsgrund alles Subjektiven, aller Gerstesakte und zugleich der Einheitsgrund aller objektiven Wirklichkeit das Gottesbewustsein, das zugleich ein sein Gottesin uns ist. Dieses System des Gleichgewichtes kann sich also nur in einer Art von Mystik vollenden, wie umgekehrt diese Mystik, die im Gefühl erlebbare Einheit von allem, den Identitätsgedanken fordert.[1]

According to Brunner, Schleiermacher's correlation of empiricism, mysticism, subjectivism, and evolution is, the typically modern interpretation of Religion.

It is the root of the Christian humanism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Schleiermacher is monistic; Brunner's position is dualistic.

> Der Christliche Glaube kennt die schlechterdings unausgleichbaren Gegensatze. Der kontradiktorische Gegensatz: wahr - faksch ist hier zum Existenzgegsatz, zur Entgegen setzung von Schopferwille und Sunde vertieft,

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[1] Ibid., p. 329.

> Zwischen allen christlichen Gegensatzen ist jene tiefe Kluft befestigt, durch die kein stetiger weg des mehr und mehr, des weniger und weniger fuhrt. Zwischen Schopfer und Geschopf, Sunde und Gnade, Erwahlung und Verwerfung, Zorn und Versohnung gibt es keine stetigen Uebergange, uberhaupt keine Uebergange. Hier ist der Gegensatz ja - nein tausendfach gesteigert, weil existentiell personlich geworden. Zwischen Heil und Unheil ist kein Kontinuum, also kein Sowohl-als-auch, sondern nur das Entwederoder. Die Aufhebung der Gegensatze oder des Zwiespaltes, die hier stattfindet, ist: der Widerspruch gegen den Widerspruch, der Tod des Todes, das Paradox und Wunder der Versohnung und Erlosung, das dem unbergreiflichen Gegensatz des Sundenfalles entspricht. Zwischendrin liegt die absolute Diskontinuitat, die durch kein. Dazwischenschieben von Mittelgliedern, sondern nur durch die Gegensetzung des gottlichen Schopferwillens zu uberwinden ist.[1]

According to Brunner: To Schleiermacher, God is the soul of the world; to Brunner, on the contrary, God is the creator of the world. He is no limitless, bounless, infinite being, hardly to be distinguished from the world. He is not immanent in the world. God and the world are not mutually correlated.

Schleiermacher's doctrine of continuous creation was plausible only because he failed to recognize the absolute difference that exists between God and Nature.

Brunner affirms that there is no continuity. There yawns a great gulf between creator and creature. Over against both men and nature is the transcendent God. It is as impossible to go through nature to God as it is to go through human nature to God. There is no meaning of God in human experience or history.

The human and the divine do not overlap. The best

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[1] Ibid., p. 334tt.

in us is never God in us. Out of nothing God created the world. According to Brunner this doctrine of creation ex nihilo, is not intended to explain the origin of the world but to maintain God's absolute freedom and difference as over against the world. Having created the world, He is its sovereign and its free lord.

God could not be free anymore than we if he were imprisoned by the chain of cause and effect.

That God is no wise dependent on the world for his existence nor bound in any way by nature makes thenkable his freedom and hence his personality.

Personality is not a limitation upon God for personality is essentially free and arbitrary.

God, for instance, is free to love whom he will, or to give theworld an entirely different constitution, changing completely its laws, natural and spiritual. Being personal, God can enter into personal relations. It was to enjoy personal relations with human beings that he created the world.

But the personal relations which God initially established between himself and human beings have been broken by the latter through the misuse of their original freedom. Their disobedience is, an insult to his honor.

God is the great lawgiver and Judge. He cannot permit contempt of court to go unpunished. Were that to happen he would cease to be God. His punishment is not

pedogogical discipline but the penalty exacted by an offended sovereign and inexorable judge Juridical symbols best suggest the relation between God and man.[1]

The obstacle that lies athwart the road between them is not sin as Schleiermacher understood sin. According to Brunner, to Schleiermacher sin was something negative, an absence of the consciousness of God. It was because Schleiermacher never thought in terms of an absolute difference between right and wrong that he could talk of sin as though it were imperfection or mistake.

His principle of relativity prevented him from acknowledging the absolute demands upon himself of the law of God. He was insensitive to the categorical imperative. He was spiritually in no position to appreciate the gospel of justification and reconciliation any more than a man who has never been sick can appreciate a cure or a recovery. Brunner himself does not undertake to explain sin. The most significant thing about it, he claims, is that it is inexplicable. It is irrational. Only a man who takes it lightly like Schleiermacher could fit sin into a metaphysical system of thought.

To explain sin is to explain it away in its stark irrationality.

The doctrine of Original sin, far from being an explanation, serves only to bring out more impressively

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[1] Brunner, Der Mittler aun Besinnung über den Christusglauben. 1927. p. 192, 565.

its irrationality.

Brunner is not concerned with particular sin. In so far as he deals with the content of sin he confines himself to the general statement of fact that people fail to live up to the stern moral obligations which they cannot but acknowledge are theirs. They break Goad's laws, they are disobedient to the divine Lawgiver.

They know themselves to be personally estranged from him and yet they can do nothing about it. It is impossible for them to re-establish the broken personal relationship. In fact, Brunner becomes quite non-empirical in his treatment of sin.[1]

Schleiermacher was far from right in treating sin and the consciousness of sin as identical and interchangeable. The existence of sin cannot be experienced. We do not become aware of our sin by looking deeply into our hearts. We infer that we are sinners because such an inference is the only possible explanation of the undoubted fact of God's ignominious death on the Cross. What other reason could there be for this than that we are sinners and that the great gulf which yawns between us and the Holy one must be crossed by the latter?

The very fact that God thus comes to us is evidence that we are farther away from him than we may have thought we were. Brunner's doctrine of sin is a priori rather than

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[1] Die Mystik und das wort. 2nd edition 1928. p. 340, p. 397.

empirical.

If there is, then, no way from man to God, there is a way from God to man. God can himself take the initiative and effect an entrance into the human sphere. Being intangible by human experience and not reachable through human exercises however pious, God must perforce remain unknown unless he makes himself known to us.

Hence a revelation of some kind becomes indespensible if we are to be saved.

Yet this revelation cannot be given in terms of human experience.

It must arise outside the human sphere altogether else it will partake of human frailty and be incapable of mediating to us the saving contact with objectivity which alone is the cure for our subjectivity.

On the other hand this revelation, since it is the revelation of a personal God - "the absolute as personal reality"[1] can occur only through the medium of personality. The dilemma is resolved by the paradox of a God-man.[2] This personal agent of salvation entered human experience as a historical figure, Jesus of Nazareth.

But "in so far as Jesus is an historical figure and his life an historical event, he is not the revelation of God.[3]

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[1] Religionsphilosophie Evangelischer Theologie. p.36.

[2] Der Mittler p. 201.

[3] Religionsphilosophe p.75.

Jesus' personality is a historical phenomenon. History is merely human experience. To fix attention on Jesus as the founder of Christianity is to interpret it in human terms. To praise Jesus as one among other religious geniuses, though gaving a maximum degree of religiosity, is still to place him within the ranges of natural human possibility. To evaluate him as a dynamic personality operating within the realm of humanity to enliven in people an already existent but latent consciousness of God, is also to leave him within the human sphere. Of all this Schleiermacher was guilty.

According to Brunner, what constitutes Jesus the mediator is the fact or the faith that he is from the other side, the God side. His origin is different from ours. He is from God. "Nur sein Wort, sofern es da ist, sofern es gegeben ist, sofern es herabkommt von der anderen Seite, ist Nichkreatur, Gottheit.[1] Schleiermacher was wrong in his assertion that the difference between Jesus and other people is a qualitative difference. Jesus was not just a greater St. Francis. Were he like any other persin in history he would not be the revelation of God. The difference between us and Jesus is absolute. Jesus breaks the continuity of history. Our relation to Jesus is a non-historical one. On the other hand, ther is in this relation to Christ nothing of a Christ-Mysticism.

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[1] Der Mittler. p. 199.

The Christ of faith is not the object of our ecstatic feeling and vision. He is unique. He is a word, an act of God. His sovereignty is a strange beggarly sovereignty.[1] That the sovereign of the world is thus gracious and willing to free us from the bonds of death and hell is more wonderful than words can tell. We are face to face with one of the strongest of all paradoxes; that God, who has created the world and filled it, who holds all things in his hand, who is omnipresent and almighty - comes. "der Gott, der die Welt geschaffen hat und alles fullt, alles in seiner Hand halt, der allgegenwartige und allmachtige - kommt." [2]

This divine graciousness is unapparent to the unbeliever. To the unfaithful God remains always a hidden God, a deus absconditus, or at most an angry God, whose character is to be inferred from the nature of the physical world. But the believer knows that by the offices of the Mediator Atonement is made for his sin and God and man are reconciled. Redemption is thus made effective and is accepted. To be sure, a man still remains a sinner. Each day he must repent anew, for even the life which has been reconciled to God is not apart from the rest of social life. Since we do not as believers withdraw from the social order, either by a kind of monastic segregation or by sui-

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[1] Ibid., p. 500.

[2] Ibid., p. 254.

cide, we continue to be "poisoned" by it. In other words the redemption points to the future. Faith is eschatological. The believer is not saved, but he believes he will be. according to Brunner, Schleiermacher's notion of salvaliton as a present possession must be given up.[1]

Salvation is a promise. The Christian remains in a state of perpetual tension. He never becomes content. What the ultimate salvation will be like he does not claim to know. But he is sure of it, even hough he cannot conceive it. As a believer he can wait for it in confident despair, in despairing confidence, in certainty and uncertainty.

Brunner declares that Schleiermacher was optimistic.

Finally we can say this: inspite of Brunner's misunderstanding of Schleiermacher he has made a real contribution to a discussion that has lasted a hundred years and is far from dying down.

Brunner has thrown Schleiermacher from heaven to earth, and in so doing he has given him fresh life today.

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[1] Die Mystik und das Wort. pp.261, 264, 385.

CHAPTER V

CRITICISM OF BRUNNER

As I stated in the introduction, I do not intend to deny the contribution of Brunner's theology. Especially we should say that his work Gebot und die Ordnungen is one of the greatest works in the world of theology today.

In this chapter we shall try to clarify the position of Schleiermacher and criticize Brunner's theology.

The first part is a treatment of the source of the crisis theology today. The second part treats the general characteristics of Schleiermacher's Christian faith criticizing Brunner's theology.

The third part contains a criticism of the debate which recently took place between Barth and Brunner and clarified the way which should be taken by the philosophy of Religion and Christian theology today.

Brunner's theology is watched by the thinking world, in relation to the name of Schleiermacher. But this relation is not a friendly one. Schleiermacher's theology influenced protestant theology during the last century.

As his religious thought is the general religious thought of the modern cultural world, his theology was the highest valuable common thought of modern Christian faith.

We can say, that the school of History since Albrecht Ritschl and the school of psychology, is derived from his theological thought. In other words, all theological tendencies which have appeared since the Reformation, for example orthodox theology and natural theology, are embraced by him through his criticism. We can say that Schleiermacher is placed in the center of the theology of the evangelical Christian church as Immanuel Kant is placed in the center of modern philosophy.

In the same way that Immanuel Kant is the founder of modern philosophy, Schleiermacher is the founder of modern protestant theology.

If we think that Kant, is the representative who gives the philosophical ground to the scientific spirit since the Renaissance, Schleiermacher must be the representative who gives the theological ground to the protestant faith. They are classics in these two worlds. No one would doubt Schleiermacher's place in Protestant theology until today.

Brunner's theology tends to doubt Schleiermacher's place. Brunner's theology is extremely opposed to Schleiermacher's position.

He has thrown down on the earth the name of Schleiermacher which was glorified during the last century.

This is irony, that Brunners theology has thrown Schleiermacher from heaven to earth and again given him a fresh life.

Since the first world war, all cultural nations, and also the theology of the evangelical Church have fallen into a crisis. No one can doubt this. Karl Barth and Brunner's so-called dialectical theology expresses this crisis clearly, for the Dialectical theology is called the "theology of crisis". But the word "crisis" means something defferent from our daily use of it. According to Barth and Brunner, it means that the Christian is under the judgment of God. The Christian is always judged by God. According to Brunner, the "crisis" means κρίσις (Krisis) that is the separation - the distance between - God and man. It can be said that the name "Dialectical" came from the relation between the judment and the grace in the dialogue of God and man. No one can doubt that the crisis in this meaning has been neglected in recent theology.

But did Schleiermacher as he representative of the faith of the spirit of the Reformation neglect this? This is the question. Brunner's theology appeared since the end of the first world war. Ever man understands this theology as the theology of thepsychology of war. Such cultural-historical understanding is true, but such an understanding is dangerous.

The reason forthe development of the Dialectical theology as a whole can not be reduced to the psychology of war.

The crisis in the theology of the evangelical church

today lies in the depth of foregoing theology. This crisis existed ten years before the first world war.[1] The crisis modern theology began with the death of Albrecht Ritschl (1889) the great theologian of Gottingen, because, the Ritschlian school, tends to form the so-called Historicism. Of course, all theology has History and system as its constructive elements. But this one-sided Historicism not only thought of the historical study as one department of theology, but also maintained that all theological study was limited to the historical study, and attempted to clarify the problem of faith by this method alone.

The study of history in Historicism assets that the historical study itself is the criteria of faith. History is not studied by the special scientific system of faith, nor by the special theological theory. Rather the study of history itself is the theory of faith. We can say that "Das wesen des Christentums"[2] by Adolf von Harnack is a typical expression of Historicism.

Harnack attempted to clarify the nature of Christianity from the pure historical point of view. He is a great scholar of the history of Christian Doctrine, and of the History of the Christian Church. All liberal theologians in this age are historians and asserted historicism. The name of Ernst Troeltsch paralleled the name

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1 Heim Karl, Der evangelische Glaube und das denken der Gegenwart. Bd. I

2 Das wesen des Christentums. 1900. Adolf von Harnack. 1851-1930.

of Harnack, at the beginning of the first world war. But it is a very sorrowful thing that he passed away after the great war.

Troeltsch was more sociological and philosophical in his historical view than was Harnack. But he is in the place of Historicism with Harnack, Julius Kaftan and Wilh. Herrmann. But Troeltsch combined the tasks of theology with the general history of religion more than they. Of course, he believed that the final criteria of all "worlds-view" and "life's-view" can be reduced from history. This is the characteristic of Historicism. His philosophy of History stood in the Historicism. His philosophy was his apriorism, rising out of Kant's thought. But he did not try to interpret history with the same norm of value that Kant used. Rather he presupposed the "Historical thing", "Das Historische".

He attempted to understand religion in general - including Christianity - by the form of development which is followed in the world of history.

This Historicism is an element of crisis of evangelical theology today. Of course we find this germ in the theology of Schleiermacher. But there is another element for the crisis today - psychologism. This psychologism influenced the Theology and especially systematic theology before the first world war. Pure psychologism attempted to apply, all principles of empirical psychology, to the study of theology analizing the consciousness of faith and

and attempting to clarify the nature and truth of faith.

This psychologism arose in the German evangelical theology after Schleiermacher. In fact, Schleiermacher's Christian faith, has in itself the tendency to this psyshologism. But I want to call attention the words after Schleiermacher. His Christian faith is not a mere analysis of the psychology of faith. As we have seen above, such psychologism does not belong to his theology. But the later interpreters of Schleiermacher took this psychological attitude. We can find an extreme polemic against the psychologism of Schleiermacher in Brunner's theology. Especially in his book Die Mystik und das Wort.[1] We can find the contrast between the theology of Schleiermacher and the so-called Dialectical theology in this book as we have seen. We can respect their ground of faith and respect the development of their thought, but here we must treat the problem of objective truth (fact) in the Christian faith of Schleiermacher. Here we must turn our eyes to the historical process of psychologism.

Erlanger theology took psychologism as its ground. But this theology has returned to the "dogmatic-confessional theology"- "dogmatische-Konfessionalle theologie". We can find the original germ of psychologism in this theology. The principle of faith is identified with the consciousness of faith, psychologism developed into the Vermittlungs

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[1] Der Mystik und das Wort, First Edition, 1924. Second edition, 1938.

theologie, and more over into the Ritschlian school.

As we have seen above, psychologism is combined with Historicism. Through the combination of psychologism with Historicism there appeared the "Leben-Jesu-Bewegung" i.e., the "life-Jesus Movement" in the field of Vermittlungs theologie, for example, Beyschlag, Bernhard Weiss.

The Ritschlians tried to get the theological Dogmatic basic statement from the reflection upon the inner life of Jesus.

Representative of the Ritschlians is W. Herrman. Historicism and psychologism controoled the German theology before the first world war. Here is the crisis in Historicism and psychologism. But the great world war brought a sudden change in this field. Barth's and Brunner's so-called Dialectical theology brought the sudden change to the German theology. No one can deny this fact. They presented the crisis which existed latently but their efforts were not to save he theology from this crisis, rather they accentuated this crisis. Historicism lost the authority of Christianity. Psychologism could not catch the characteristic of Christian experience, rather it tended to universalize it.

Barth's and Brunner's theology pointed out this crisis clearly. Does Brunner's theology have a victory over neo-protestantism since Schleiermacher? Barth understood the crisis of Historicism and psychologism. But did Barth

himself recognize the authority of protestantism as over against Catholicism?

As Schleiermacher destroyed the traditionalism and Rationalism, has Brunner's theology destroyed Historicism and Psychologism?

It is clear that the source of the theology of the evangelical church is the spirit of the reformation.

Brunner's theology has called attention to this fact. Of course Historicism and Psychologism universalized and rationalized and liberalized the Christian theology. But we can find the attitude of Historicism and psychologism since Schleiermacher in the spirit of the Reformation. No one can deny that the Reformation is related to the Renaissance and Humanism. It is related to the objective knowledge of history, the freedom of faith.

Is not Historical study and Historical criticism the result of the struggle against the anti-historical attitude of Roman Catholicism? Can not the psychological method of thinking and the form of expression of faith be traced to the spirit of the reformation which is related to the freedom of man? Luther's exegesis of Matthew 10:18 is the attitude of historicism, and the "testimonium spiritus sanctus canoti internum","inner witness of the Holy Spirit" in the first page of"Christian freedom" is the germ of psychologism.

Brunner's theology presupposed the crisis of man

and an absolute gulf between man and God and the judgment of God.

"From faith to theology" there must be some problem but Brunner has neglected this problem. If the Christian faith is separated from all philosophical speculation and from all human effort, not only theology as a science, but also the proclamation of faith - in fact all efforts of the church will become impossible. Such Christianity must keep quiet as mysticism. Against this thought, it can be said that the preaching and thinking of the theologian are in the guidance of the revelation of God. But is not this assertion itself a speculation?

One of the tasks of theology must be to distinguish the fact of the content of faith of he individual from the selfishness of man. It seems that Brunner's theology as a whole brought to man again the predeterministic worlds-view of Calvin.

Brunner preache about the Dialectic between God and man, but he himself asserted his own words before he heard the assertion of other. He does not care about the fact that the Historian and the psychologist tried to seek the concrete event of Christianity and to understand Christian history and consciousness. Consequently, Brunner's theology does not show us the way future protestantism is going. I believe that this way will be opened through Schleiermacher who is the founder of evangelical theology

since the Reformation.

Here we want to pick up the general characteristic of Christian faith, criticizing Brunner's theology.

The ground attitude of Schleiermacher's theology was the theological reflection upon the "spirit of the age". Consequently it was a production of its time. He fought against Traditionalism and rationalism, and he conquered these enemies. These two battles were the important tasks for protestant theology. Luther's protest against Scholastic philosophy was directed against these two enemies.

Schloastic philosophy combined in itself Traditionism and rationalism. It is ironical, that Brunner's theology, in fighting against Historicism and psychologism, forgot the enemies of evangelical theology. Brunner's theology when pushed to its extreme, wonders about traditionalism and rationalism. Brunner, attempts to explain the structure of he fact of faith with a logical method - the Dialectical Method.

The traditional recognition and theological deduction of the doctrine brings nothing to the heart of the Christian.

Brunner's theology is the rational and logical understanding of Religion. It used logically the following Calvinistic reformer's ground statement: "finitum non capax infiniti finite being can not catch the infinite Being".

"Catch the eternal in the Moment", "seeing the infinite in the finite", this is the thought of Schleiermacher. And yet, the ground statement of Luther, was the "finitum capax infiniti", over against the Calvinistic statement. We can find the straight line from Luther to Schleiermacher in this point.

Schleiermacher explained the nature of religion, as the Schlechthiniges abhangigkeits - gefuhl, the feeling of absolute dependence.

It is clear that he thought as follows: "since Dogmatic is a theological discipline and pertains solely to the Christian church, we can only explain what it is when we have become clear as to the conception of the Christian Church."[1] At the same time he recognized that the essential nature of Christianity should be studied in relation with the continuity of other religions, that the essential nature of an ecclesiastical communion should be understood from the study of the piety (Frommigkeit) of individuals - which forms the basis of all ecclesiastial comminion.[2] And he thought that piety is to be considered purely in itself, neither knowing, nor doing, but a modification of feeling or of immediate self-consciousness of being in relation with God.[3]

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[1] Der Christliche Glaube p.2.

[2] Ibid., ss 3.

[3] Ibid., ss 4.

Brunner doubts this conception of absolute dependence and states that the difference between the absolute dependence and the partial dependence is a quantitative difference in Schleiermacher's thought; it is a defference of degree, - it is not a qualitative and fundamental difference.

We can find here a lack of understanding of Schleiermacher in Brunner which is based upon the misunderstanding of Schleiermacher's methodology which asserts the scientific impossibility of a theology which starts from the separation of God and man.

So far as theology is a science, the scientific system is impossible without clear presupositions on the side of man.

Absolute dependence of man, accordign to Ott's conception - the creativity of man - indicates the fundamental disruption between God and man.

Schleiermacher did not doubt this. He did not think that there was immediate continuity between God and man. We can see this in his earlier work (Reden). Such a position, is a Deistic position which Schleiermacher opposed. Schleiermacher thought the nature of religion to be the relation between God and man as seen in the self-consciousness of man. Through this, Religion becomes a possession of man. But the content of religion as the possession of man, is the self-consciousness of the relationship with the "absolute

other".

Brunner's understanding of Schleiermacher is dogmatic, in so far as, he must identify Religion with Fetish.

The fundamental assumption in Schleiermacher's Christian faith is that, the nature of Christianity should be understood from the Christian motif itself. It must exclude all philosophical specultation. Of course this is a new question - the relationship between the nature of Christianity which is understood by such a procedure and philosophical speculation. But one must exclude philosophical speculation from the understanding of the nature of Christianity. Schleiermacher demands this decidedly. In spite of this , Brunner criticizes that Schleiermacher explains he nature of Christianity from the standpoint of philosophical speculation. In fact we know that Schleiermacher himself does not fulfill this demand. But we must not overlook his great effort and great plan to meet this demand.

The misunderstanding of Schleiermacher often comes from the identification of his order of method of description and his order of conception of faith as can be seen in the following example: Christianity is a monotheistic faith, belonging to the teleological type of religion, and is essentially distinguished from other such faiths by the fact that in it everything is related to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth.[1]

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[1] Ibid., ss 11.

Even though at first he says that "Christianity is a monotheistic faith, belonging to the teleological type of religion" this is a problem of he philosophy of History, the essential thing in this statement is "Christianity is essentially distinguished from other such faiths by the fact that in it everything is related to the redemption accomphished by Jesus of Nazareth. If in the relation with this passage, Brunner criticizes Schleiermacher, he is involved in the same mistake as suggested above. The logic of the Dialectic method which is used by Brunner is the method of philosophy. Not only his doctrine, but also his biblical exegens is entirely conditioned by his logic. If this be allowed, and the dialectic method is recognized as the most concrete theological method, the criticism of Schleiermacher is the mere criticism of method.

In relation with the preceeding discussion here is an important difficulty. This difficulty is the interaction between the object of faith (God) and the subject of faith(man) in the understanding of man. If we use the phenomenological words this difficulty is the interaction between Noema and Noesis of faith. "fides quae creditur" that is the understanding of the object of faith is conditioned by "fides qua creditur" - the understanding of the subject of faith, vice versa.

It is clear that Schleiermacher treated this relation under the form of speculation. But we can trace

this view to Luther.

Luther says "what is the meaning to love one God. It is to trust in Him, to have faith in Him, to expect all good in Him. And He is the place of refuge in the struggle. The heart grasps at him, the heart depends on Him: to depend on Him with all one heart means to devote oneself to Him; the heart transcends the earth and detaches itself from the earth and adjusts to God. Glaube und Gotthehoren zu Haufe faith and God fit together. If faith and trust are right, your God is right, and if trust is false, there is no true God, because these two, faith and God, fit together."[1]

Albrecht Ritschl recognized these words of Luther. He interpreted these words by the theory of Kantian value judgment. The Religious thought of the interaction of the object of faith and jubject of faith in Schleiermacher, is not to be understood as subjectivism.

Pure subjectivism only is applied to the positivism of A. A. Comte or the "philosophy of as if" of H. Vaihinger.

Schleiermacher does not think that the existence of God depends upon the faith of man.

The interaction is the interaction for us. God manifests himself to us through faith. We approach God through the way of faith. Here Schleiermacher's thought and Luther's thought are harmonized. We can find the

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[1] Der Grosse Katechismus. 1529. Wernle: Der evangelische Glaube nach den Hauptschriften der Reformatoren. I. Luther.

straight line from Luther to Schleiermacher in this point.

Finally we think about the Bible which discloses the problem of interaction of the object of faith and the subject of faith.

The Bible is the objective ground of doctrine of the evangelical church. The Bible is the living source of the divine manifestation in Jesus Christ.

Biblical faith and a faith - such as faith in the power of the Pope - which is not depndent upon the Bible, are not the same.

When Luther recognised the authority of the Bible instead of the Pope his position was not necessaryily the one of Biblical Absolutism. One can hear the word of God by the free reflection of personal experience. Personal religious experience is not the special objective source of Christian faith. But this experience helps to understand the Bible.

The following words from Schleiermacher's Christian faith should be understood from this point of view.

The authority of the Holy Schipture cannot be the foundation of faith in Christ; rather must the latter be presupposed before a peculiar authority can be granted to the Holy Scripture.[1]

The understanding of the interaction between fides quae creditur and fides qua creditur is the presupposition

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[1] Der Christliche Glaube p. 128.

of the theology of Schleiermacher and the theology of the Evangelical Church.

I believe that Schleiermacher's theology has a key which discloses the problem of theology today.

Ludwig Ihmels, Paul Althhaus, Karl Heim, Georg Wobbermin, are going to resolve the present theological problem on the ground of Schleiermacher's theology.

Moreover, Bartelheimer who follows Gogarten, does not overlook the excellent interpretation in Schleiermacher's theology.

"Zurück zu Schleiermacher und von Schleiermacher aus vorwarts das soll also die Losung fur unsene weitere Arbeit sein".[1]

Back to Schleiermacher and forward from Schleiermacher! This then, is the motto for our further investigation.

From my point of view the debate which has recently taken place between Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, is very valuable in the field of the philosophy of Religion.

Barth and Brunner agree on the following two points. On the one hand they both reject the natural theology of Revelation, on the other hand, they both reject the theoretical knowledge of God, as an object of theology. Rather they both assert the religious life as such, and Dasein

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[1] Wobbermin, Das Wesen der Religion. p. 133.

(being,existence) of man(menschheit) as an object of theology.

In spite of opposition to Schleiermacher if we take a broad view, Barth and Brunner belong to the world of modern theology, which was founded by Schleiermacher.

They both took the same theological point of view until recently. But they have now separated on the subject of natural theology.

The problem of natural theology is the problem of revelation and nature (reason) and at the same time the problem of religion(Gospel) and culture.

Of course the interest and efforts in this problem has been continued throughout all ages. There are differences between Barth and Brunner about natural theology.

Barth denied absolutely the revelation and Grace without salvation. According to Barth, if man recognises the general revelation, he, consequently, find the special meaning in the nature of man, which destroys the omnipotence of God. This asserts the salvation by man. This view is pelagainmism. The nature of man is nothing but sinful in front of the eternal, immeasurable grace of God, it is meaningless and valueless to say "the man is man and not cat". (Nein p.25).[1] This is the main thought of Barth. But Brunner is opposed to Barth and asserts, that the thought of general revelation was supported by Scripture and the

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[1] Nein: Antwort au Emil Brunner, Munchen 1938.

tradition of the Church. If one destroys the uniqueness of man and destroys the general revelation in nature and culture, then one denies not only salvation, but also the possibility of sin as such. One can get the knowledge of the grace of Creation through the knowledge of the grace of Salvation. Consequently, it is the privilege of the saved to understand the true meaning of nature and culture, but this can not be the reason for denying the meaning of the uniqueness of man. The nature of man is personality (personlichkeit) and subjectivity. (subjektsein) If there is no connection with God there is no personality and subjectivity. Man (menshheit) - personality and subjectivity- has the power to obey God and disobey God. Man (menshheit) is the common ground of the sinner and the saved man. Consequently the revelation and grace of God which appear to humanity must be differentiated. If personality and subjectivity are not recognized, we can not understand the basic fact of man's responsibility (Vercontwartlichkeit) to God. The responsibility will not exist only by the work of God. It will exist between man (this man can respond (verantwortlich) to the word of God) and God.[1] This is Brunner's main thought. Barth's effort is to maintain the purity of the thought of the Grace of God which is the central doctrine of Christianity. In this point, we can say, Barth is a successor of Augustine, Luther, and Calvin.

Barth awwerted his opinion logically. Brunner opposed Barth logically, too. It seems to me that logical

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[1] Natur und Gnade; zum Gesprach mit Karl Barth. Tubinger 1935. 2te Auflage.

assertion is sometimes valuable but sometimes not so valuable before living facts. It seems a logical contradiction to say there stands the I and Subject aginst the Absolute and Omnipotent God. But this view is the result of the attitude which treated the relation between God and the I as an objective relationship on the horizontal plane. Consequently this contradiction is the result of a contemplative attitude upon the relationship between God and man.

One who wants to meet Absolute reality(God) must leave the world of logic and must enter the world of religious experience. In the world of religious experience the fact that seems to be a logical contradiction appears to be a basic fact. The word of God requires the reality (realität) of its hearer (man). The thought that if man does not recognise the uniqueness of Grace of creation, man is a cat, is nonsense. Salvation without a sinner who will (will) be saved, is the wrestling of God without the adversary.

Creation (Schöpfung) is the appearance of the Grace of omnipotence of God, and is a wonderful fact. Therefore, in so far a man stands on the basis of religious experience, to admit the fact of the Grace of Salvation, is not the same as to admit that man has right to obey or disobey, which infringes on the field of the grace of God.

If there is not given the fact of sin, we need not separate grace into two, grace of creation and grace of

Salvation. Therefore, the creation is the basic idea and salvation, so to speak, is the second creation, the special figure of the Grace of Creation. I think this view is a correct understanding and it is a reasonable point of view.

Observing regular order of religious experience, we are aware of the Grace of Creation only after the Grace of Salvation from Sin. But in this case too, as in Aristotle's thought "the order as we aprehend it, is not same as it actually is. As Brunner asserted, it is true that the experience of Salvation, is the starting point, and the basic central experience in Christianity, but it is not unjust to admit with Christian Dogmatic the broader significance of creation and the uniqueness of Salvation. To say that man was created only to commit sin, that is only for Salvation, - this is Barth's extreme thought - is nonsense and meaningless in Christian theology. But it is clear that to admit the stand point of Brunner, as reasonable is not the same as admitting concrete content of his opinion.

As we have seen above, Barth and Brunner disagree concerning the problem of natural theology. In fact, nature and culture are realities (Sein) with which we as Christians are in contact. We cannot deny, and overlook them. Therefore it seems the duty of Christian theology to admit and recognise the existence of natural theology as Brunner aims to treat nature and culture as object of the scientific

study of Christian theology. The question is, what is its form and system as a science?

Brunner substituted the Christian natural theology - Christliche theologia naturalis - to Christliche Lehre von der allgemeinen order Naturoffenbarung, and moreover he added "eine Lehre von der objectiven Erkennbarkeit Gottes in Seinen Schöpfungswerk, wie sie nur innerhall einer Christlischen Theologie... moglich ist . (a doctrine of the objective knowability of God in His work of Creation.)

Here arises an important problem. What is the attitude of natural theology toward the study of general and natural revelation? or what is the meaning of the objective knowability of God? Brunner's thought upon this problem is clear. This knowledge of theology is never naturalistic and rationalistic knowledge. It belongs to the reason which is illuminated by the revelation of Grace of Salvation in Jesus Christ. The understanding which is based upon Scripture is the only correct understanding." This is true, as an expression of the fundamental principle of Christian theology. But in this interpretation we can find traces of Thomistic, natural rationalistic theology. His relationship to Thomistic-rationalistic theology is so ambiguous. Does Brunner mean by the phrase "object of natural revelation" revelation as such, that is God in working as subject, or does it mean experience of revelation as object of theoretical knowledge?

Does the adjective "Christliche"(Christian) mean only to state the ground of knowledge on the Bible? If so, such natural theology is the theology of rationalism or the theology of supernaturalism as the disguise of rationalism which Brunner rejects. We need not discuss further the concrete content of his thought. It is clear that Brunner does not treat the important and fundamental question; is the object of theology as a science God, God's work, or the content of the religious experience of man? He does not concern himself with this subject. The revelation, that is to say, the word of God is the word of man, namely the content of religious experience, or its expression is the stand point of reflection. Nevertheless there is no connection between the content of man's religious experience and God, Reality. Here all theology and theoretical knowledge, is forbidden to step outside the understanding of the content of religious experience. Of course Brunner has this consciousness, but his consciousness is ambiguous.Karl Barth pointed out that the word "knowability" "Erkennbarkeit" is an ambiguous word and rejected his natural theology as a Rtionalistic Thomistic sort of natural theology. It is clear that when the world of natural Being, that is to say, nature and culture, in relation with the Gospel is treated as an object of our theoretical knowledge from the stand point of Christian theology, it is difficult to understand it by the content of revelation or by the central doctrine

of Christianity, or by logical explanation. It will be understood that the central doctrine of Christianity is either the content of revelation or the experience of revelation. And the significance of theoretical knowledge which treats God as an object of its knowledge will be further admitted. But we can not find in the Bible the systematic doctrine which treats nature and culture as its object. Of course, we can find teachings which are related to nature and culture in the Bible. If theology strictly asserts its position as a historical science and limits its task to describe the content of the Bible as a fact, there is no inner relation between the content of the Bible and the scientific consciousness which treats the contents of the Bible as an object of study. On the other hand, if the aims and the works of theologians and theology are connected with the assertions of the truth of the content of the Bible, - as Berth's and Brunner's theology tried - the defectiveness of the contents of the Bible indicates the lack of scientific status. Here theology must have a duty not only to understand the contents of the Bible in their mutual relationship, but also to assert that the contents contain a Higher principle, and theology understands nature and culture from the standpoint of this higher principle. It is clear that theology should display its systematical characteristic to all direction. (Ethic, social nature, and culture, etc.) Barth limited the work of theo-

logy to a search of the contents of the Gospel, and consequently he isolated himself. Since there is no nature and culture as a work of God in his theological thought, he refuses to treat nature and culture as objects of theological study. But theology must be systematical, and treat the problems of nature and culture. God and revelation and all Being and all facts which are related to our human existence become objects of theology. Therefore the method of treatment of nature and culture must be fundamental. Here we must require the philosophical method. Theology can not exist without philosophy. Barth too used this method. But his attitude to philosophy is ambiguous, and he is too subjective. He has no conviction. Brunner too lacks the fundamental systematical interest in philosophy. He always talks about philosophy. But he treats it not as an important thing which encloses the great purposes of man, rather he uses it as an object of criticism. The philosophy which stands before his eyes is not philosophy as such, but particular standpoints of philosophy, or philosophical teachings. For him philosophy of religion as the name of his work "Religions philosophie Evangelischer" indicates, is a part of theology, which treats revelation and reason. In fact philosophy of religion is a part of natural theology.[1] We can not find in his thought, the fundamental systematical method. Theology,

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[1] Religionsphilosophie evangelischer theologie. By Brunner, Munich; Oldenbourg. 1927. The philosophy of religion from the stand point of protestant theology, English translation, A. J. D. Farrer, p. 17 tt.

especially rational theology requires philosphy.

When one steps into the world of philosophy, he faces the great problem: can we make God an object of our theoretical knowledge? or should we make God an object of our theoretical knowledge? This is the problem. Rationalism, which made an affirmative answer, was refused. The object of theoretical treatment should be the way of life of the believer who lives with God, the contents of the Man's prophetic apprehension of God's word, the way of life of the believer who sacrifices his whole life to Jesus Christ, and the contents of man's experiences with God, and man's experiences of Grace.

We must treat nature and culture in its relation to this content of religious experience. From this point of view the Christian way of life belongs to the religious way of life, therefore natural theology must require a philosophy which understands and treats religion in its relation to natural and cultural life. We can find here the true philosophy of Religion.

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